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through knowledge superiority. Integration revolves around internal, structural factors 
that the organization can manipulate to achieve its strategic goals. The fundamental 
concept behind the research is that an organization’s self-awareness allows leaders to 
select the best approaches to achieve knowledge superiority, leading to sustainable 
competitive advantages and market leadership. The research behind this thesis identifies 
four attributes of self-awareness that are critical contributors to knowledge superiority: 
success decomposition, targeted dissemination of knowledge, organizational design, and 
individual decision making.  
The three arguments of organizational needs that this thesis seeks to address are 
(1) firms do not understand precisely why they succeed, (2) market leaders feel they must 
compromise either the power or uniqueness of their knowledge and competitive 
advantage, and (3) the design and goals of existing knowledge management systems do 
not fit the organization’s design. The thesis examines the hierarchy of needs of the 
organization’s stakeholders and proposes a knowledge management system that 
integrates the self-awareness attributes that contribute to knowledge superiority. It 
develops a theoretical architecture for the system, which prioritizes the needs and 
selection criteria for that system.  
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It is better to know nothing, than to keep in mind fixed ideas based on 
theories whose confirmation we constantly seek. 
 —Claude Bernard, An Introduction to the Study of 
Experimental Medicine, 1865 
Knowledge management (KM) theory argues that as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage, knowledge is the critical element needed for any organization to 
innovate and succeed (Porter and Millar 1985). Its timely and correct flow allows 
organizations to leverage tacit and explicit knowledge to gain market share in their field 
and to gain influence and even more knowledge (Nissen 2006). That increase translates 
into a greater competitive advantage, such that when an organization achieves market 
dominance, it leverages both its current knowledge and its increased ability to learn more, 
quicker than smaller, less knowledgeable competitors (Tuomi 1999; Alavi and Leidner 
2001). The gap becomes insurmountable. The market leader becomes entrenched; it is 
secure from any upstart rising through imitation.  
Reality, however, tells a completely different story. Market leaders, in the private 
or public arena, do not retain their superior position indefinitely and many times only for 
a short time. The competitive lead based on knowledge at some point dwindles and a 
smaller, less knowledgeable competitor overtakes the incumbent. In many cases, the fall 
from the top of the market is so drastic that the former leader, if it survives, does so as a 
much-diminished player in the market it once dominated, much like it happened with 
Research in Motion’s Blackberry (McNish and Silcoff 2015; Dummett 2015).  
This thesis seeks to answer the question of why knowledge does not lead to 
sustainable competitive advantage. According to business and knowledge management 
(KM) literature, the premise is correct in terms of competitive advantage, but something 
is missing so that market dominance is sustainable. The term for this lack of 
sustainability is “creative destruction,” coined in the 1940s, to describe how innovation 
disrupts market hierarchies and is essentially unstoppable (Schumpeter 2008).  
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This inability to sustain competitive advantage led the author of the thesis to 
examine organizational theory to gain understanding of potential factors that may hinder 
KM efforts. Expanding the focus of the thesis yielded important findings that determined 
the course of the research in the thesis captured by Mintzberg in 1981.  
• Knowledge management goals and methodologies correspond to what 
organizational theory calls means of coordination. 
• The five means of coordination that Mintzberg identifies are a one-for-one 
fit with a specific organizational structure. 
• Two of those structures coordinate by standardizing results, either via 
expert divisional leadership, or with individual SMEs in an adhocracy. An 
adhocracy, as defined by Mintzberg, “is a tremendously fluid structure, in 
which power is constantly shifting and coordination and control are by 
mutual adjustment through the informal communication and interaction of 
competent experts” (Mintzberg 1981, 111). 
Much of the research into sustaining competitive advantage focuses on 
duplicating it, mostly by exact copying and implementing the processes that yielded 
successful working templates. Exact duplication, however, only fits with one type of 
organizational structure, which is a machine bureaucracy such as a fast food restaurant or 
a manufacturing plant. These organizations enjoy a substantial understanding of why they 
are successful, and most of their relevant tacit knowledge is well codified (Szulanski and 
Jensen 2008). Many organizations strive for this KM methodology, regardless of its fit to 
the organization’s structure. Duplication requires the codification of tacit knowledge, 
which implies a high level of expertise that the organization is looking to convey to its 
stakeholders (Alavi and Leidner 2001).  
When the organization’s structure does not match the appropriate means of 
coordination, it neutralizes the benefits of the KM systems and the competitive advantage 
gained from them. Compounding the problem is the misplaced confidence of 
organizational leaders that the codification of tacit knowledge leads to greater 
competitive advantages.  
Combining KM and organizational theory, the thesis then proposes an updated 
KM system that focuses on the two kinds of structures that require standardization of 
results for a proper fit. This allows the organization to evaluate KM system performance 
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based on measurable duplication of success based on the bottom line, and not just on the 
process that auditors and inspectors seek. Standardization of results is incompatible with 
standardization of processes, so the key individuals involved with the organization’s 
successes require additional training in command and control to make the most 
appropriate decisions possible.  
The thesis then focuses on the architecture and selection criteria for attributes and 
functions of a proposed KM system that addresses the needs. It combines the four critical 
attributes into a singular design that drives innovation and protects the organization from 
decisions that lacked organizational self-awareness. This system has the additional 
benefit of becoming the source of the organization’s competitive advantage, giving it 
greater control while masking the value of the system that drives innovation from 
competitors. As long as imitators remain focused on products and processes, instead of 
on the KM system itself as the source of innovation, the organization can continue to 
leverage and increase its knowledge power without risking knowledge uniqueness.  
This thesis represents a contribution to the study of KM for different types of 
organizational structures. Further study would test some of the assertions in this research, 
especially the quantifiable cost of misfit structures and KM methodologies, or the 
marginal impact on the organization’s performance based on the decision-making skill 
level of individuals working in divisionalized bureaucracies or adhocracies. An 
interesting area of further study specific for the public sector would be to analyze the 
impact of how it audits and evaluates the performance of government agencies.  
The government often creates new agencies as problem-solving organizations that 
require innovative cultures and a high concentration of subject matter experts (SMEs), 
which is the definition of an adhocracy (Mintzberg 1981). Yet a few years after their 
creation, the expectation is that they codify the SMEs’ knowledge to reduce manpower 
costs and secure knowledge gains for the government. The question would be: how 
would one measure the cost to the government of creating a misfit between an adhocracy, 
which should be coordinated by mutual SME adjustment, and the imposed means of 
coordination most fitting for a machine bureaucracy, requiring standardization of 
processes. The supplemental question is: what is the expectation and the reality of what 
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the government gains quantifiably, if it even does at all, by forcing this standardization 
throughout all government agencies? 
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When Apple introduced the iPhone in 2007, many of the wireless market leaders 
looked at it in disbelief. Research In Motion’s (RIM) Blackberry was the top selling 
cellphone at the time, and RIM’s CEO at the time could not understand what Apple 
thought it could accomplish by developing this telephone that was so far outside what 
was the accepted norm of what a cellphone should be (McNish and Silcoff 2015b).  
It was not that the phone was superior technologically to RIM’s current 
Blackberry offering, for it was not. It had a weaker battery, a data-hungry browser, was 
incompatible with the newest cellular networks, was not secure, and was overall a 
hodgepodge of features and capabilities that did little to make it a better phone per se. 
Not only that, but the wireless carriers had rebuffed prior attempts by RIM and others to 
add browsers and other data-intensive features on their devices. The main consumers for 
wireless devices were not really looking for many of the iPhone features at all. As RIM 
executives saw it, this iPhone was a solution in search of a problem; “it should have 
failed, but it did not” (McNish and Silcoff 2015a, 135).  
Instead of failing, the iPhone became the core business and largest profit-
generator for the largest company ever. Apple has sold over 700 million as of March 
2015 (Costello 2015), while Blackberry and most other major players in 2007 are 
struggling and downsizing (Dummett 2015), and Apple now defines the features a 
cellphone must have to be considered high quality.  
Government agencies are not immune. Around the time of the iPhone 
introduction, the Surface Navy maintenance community went through a thorough review 
of its state of affairs, especially as its ships started missing operational requirements 
and/or failing the Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) review due to material 
condition deficiencies. The 2010 Balisle Report laid out a scathing rebuke of the 
maintenance community’s lack of planning ability and resourcing, recommending, 
among other things, the creation and empowerment of a centralized maintenance 
planning agency tasked with creating, pricing, resourcing, and defending the maintenance 
requirements for a ship to achieve its Expected Service Life in good material condition 
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(Balisle 2010). The responsibility for managing this process fell to Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA), and specifically to the Maintenance Requirements System (MRS) 
Alliance under the Logistics, Maintenance, and Industrial Operations Directorate (SEA 
04), which also manages the Submarine and Aircraft Carrier maintenance programs. 
When the report became public, SEA 04 and the MRS Alliance were wholly 
unprepared to answer questions regarding the nature of the maintenance items that 
needed to be executed for surface ships, with even less of an accounting of the 
maintenance requirements that had not been done, regardless of the reason. Almost all of 
surface ship depot level maintenance is not time-directed but is condition-based; the 
maintenance plans depend on forecasting material and operating conditions for each 
system on the ship along with the maintenance that would be needed to restore the system 
to its proper condition. These forecasts allow the analysts to assess risk of 
underperformance due to insufficient resources, making the funding and planning of the 
depot availabilities more defendable and executable.  
Instead, the agency report pointed to the complex mathematical models that 
predicted the budget requirements year after year without the ability to analyze the 
reasoning behind those requirements. It was not for lack of resources, as the Balisle 
Report and other follow-on analyses resulted in increased congressional support and 
funding to repair the Surface Navy based on their findings (Office of Chief of Naval 
Operations 2010; Commander, Naval Regional Maintenance Centers 2015). The MRS 
Alliance did not see its purpose as one of engineering analysis as much as one of metrics 
and analytics. They understood the declining condition of the fleet’s material condition 
and the budget shortfalls that Navy leaders simply accepted as “a fact of life” until they 
did not (Balisle 2010). The MRS Alliance was unprepared to take action, never realizing 
that their value proposition to the Navy was the ability to identify shortfalls so that if, and 
when, the Navy prioritized the material condition of the fleet, it would be prepared to 
present specific recommendations of how to invest the additional resources.  
The Navy decided that it needed a companion agency to MRS to do the missing 
engineering analysis for maintenance, and the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management 
activity was born, growing into the Surface Maintenance Engineering and Planning 
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Program (SURFMEPP) by the end of 2010. This new agency immediately gained 
influence in every area of maintenance planning, and within two years, it had fully 
displaced MRS as the trusted agency for all aspects of planning and funding, especially 
on fiscal requirements. The MRS Alliance, which saw SURFMEPP as just one of many 
other parallel but separate agencies, never saw its decline coming. Naval Sea Systems 
Command transferred it from SEA 04 to SEA 21 in 2008, and by 2011, it was absorbed 
as a minor player within the newly-established SURFMEPP, relegated to maintaining 
historical fiscal records with little input to the funding or planning processes (Hugel and 
McManamon 2008). Few people outside of SEA 04 realize MRS exists anymore, as it 
went from a critical player to irrelevancy in less than two years. Strategic, organization-
level decisions of what to focus on led to an agency staffed with strong and dedicated 
experts being overtaken by a two-year-old organization, which in that short amount of 
time was able to demonstrate value and expertise that overshadowed MRS and relegated 
it from its market-leading position. 
At the individual level, decisions made in organizations designed to deliver 
standardized results are often subject to standardized processes that undermine the 
strength of the organizational structure. As the new incumbent market leader, 
SURFMEPP is what organizational theory describes as a combination of an adhocracy 
and a divisionalized bureaucracy (Mintzberg 1981). Designed as an innovation center, it 
is responsible for, among other things, forecasting and defending technical and financial 
requirements to achieve expected service life. Its credibility in the resourcing field of 
defense spending is without peer, and the admirals and senior defense civilians depend on 
its analysis and impartiality to provide actionable knowledge based on sophisticated and 
innovative analysis. This has allowed the surface Navy maintenance community to more 
than double its maintenance budgets from fiscal year 2010 (FY10) to the current FY15 
and beyond (Office of Chief of Naval Operations 2010; Ehret 2014).  
To achieve that level of credibility, SURFMEPP aggressively acquired a vast 
network of the top subject matter experts (SMEs) available and immediately set out to 
meet the need of defining the requirements and defending their resourcing to Congress 
(Malone and Gallagher 2015). The goal for the agency, from its inception, was to 
coordinate for standardization of results, hence its organizational structure. A few years 
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after its inception, SURFMEPP began to standardize its most commonly performed 
processes as a means of coordinating mundane tasks. While this is a common tendency 
for nascent organizations, the consequences of trying to codify every process, including 
sophisticated analysis, can be destructive to an organizational structure that does not 
support this standardization of processes. 
A recent example serves well to illustrate this point. In June of 2013, SURFMEPP 
completed its final review of the forecasted maintenance and financial requirements to 
support all depot-level work for surface ships in FY14. One of these events was a three 
million dollar, non-docking shipyard period, or “CNO depot availability,” for the USS 
PATRIOT (MCM-7). The basis of the size and scope of the maintenance event is a 
product called Ship Sheet. It uses the baseline of maintenance that SURFMEPP 
developed in the Technical Foundation Paper (TFP) for that class of ships and tailors it to 
the condition and specific requirements for the ship at the time of the maintenance event.  
This tailoring process, which is at the heart of SURFMEPP’s success, is a 
combination of subjective analysis and codified sub-processes that the agency developed 
to ensure technical rigor. One critical sub-process involves a senior SME screening a 
large amount of maintenance data to pull the “important” data for evaluation by another 
SME to determine if it will influence the final estimate for the event. The process as a 
whole has not just survived multiple inspections from senior technical and financial 
auditors but has lauded repeatedly for its rigor and defendability by both auditors and 
senior stakeholders all the way to Congress (House Armed Services Committee 2013).  
For this event, all SMEs executed their part of the process flawlessly. The 
multiple reviews of the tailoring and estimating processes all approved of the estimate 
and the process that built it. The Fleet and Type Commanders funded the shipyard event 
at 100% of the requirement, with additional resources in reserve in case there was need 
for up to 25% more funding, all developed as part of the Ship Sheet process. Then the 
final bill arrived, which was almost 200% above the original estimate (Surface 
Maintenance Engineering Planning Program 2015). On average, the rest of the fleet 
across all classes and ports closes out within 15% of the estimates (Commander, Naval 
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Regional Maintenance Centers 2015), so the agency’s Deputy called for an immediate 
investigation into what went wrong in this case.  
The results of the investigation revealed a critical weakness in the Ship Sheet 
process. Rather than permitting and training the SME to make a judgment call that was 
well within his area of expertise, the agency felt that codifying that step made the overall 
process more defendable. The process did not allow the SME to make a decision that 
would have recognized the situation, and either increase the estimate or alert the Type 
Commander to reduce the scope of the maintenance event. The auditors agreed, but the 
results did not. Fortunately, for the agency, its own leadership found the issue and took 
steps to correct it, but the root of that weakness is the more troubling.  
That root was the drive to codify a process with the purpose of measuring 
effectiveness based on compliance with it. Anecdotally, this is a common weakness 
among organizations as they mature from simple structures or small adhocracies toward 
more bureaucratic designs, especially in the public sector (Mintzberg 1981). It is a 
common complaint from the public that government agencies are “inefficient,” though 
that complaint probably means to convey dissatisfaction with a machine-like compliance 
with a process regardless of the results it generates. Inspector General assessments, or 
INSURV inspections, generally focus on compliance with internal and external processes 
as a measure of effectiveness. If the organization is not, or should not be, a machine 
bureaucracy, then process compliance is not an appropriate means of coordination 
(Mintzberg 1981). 
As a government agency, SURFMEPP was bound to fall into this trap. Even 
though it is still in its organizational infancy, very much an adhocracy, but it is shifting to 
a means of coordination more suitable for machine bureaucracies. The consequences of 
that premature shift are clear from the USS PATRIOT example above. By relying on 
process compliance, the agency deprived itself from the benefits of being an adhocracy, 
where SMEs leverage their expertise to chart the best path toward a desired end. The shift 
to compliance created a sense of safety that if the SME followed the process, the correct 
results would follow automatically. SURFMEPP instituted decision-making training for 
SMEs and feedback-analysis mechanisms to prevent this from happening again, forcing it 
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to reevaluate whether it should slow the drive toward standardization of all processes, or 
stop it altogether. 
These three examples illustrate different but related failures that knowledge 
management (KM) systems and organizational theory seek to prevent. The first illustrates 
a technology and product leader that did not understand how and why its product was 
successful, and how to duplicate that level of success. Based on the Wall Street Journal’s 
interview of Blackberry’s executive leaders in the summer of 2015, eight years after their 
fall from the top, they still do not understand (McNish and Silcoff 2015b). The second 
shows a public agency at the top of its market and level of influence designed to achieve 
standardization of results, but driven to standardize processes without checking if they 
had codified enough of their tacit knowledge to trust that their processes would lead them 
to the best results. That lack of feedback led its stakeholders to seek an upstart to achieve 
those results, and in two years took them from the highest-levels of influence to near 
irrelevance, and they never saw it coming. The third looks at that upstart, three years into 
its market-leading status, facing similar pressures to codify processes before they are able 
to deliver the desired results consistently. In this case, it identified that the problem was 
not just a misfit between structure and means of control, but also a lack of training or 
mentoring at the SME level to make command-style decisions (Shattuck and Miller 
2006), rather than rely on a process map as the ultimate technical authority.  
A. OVERVIEW 
The knowledge that upstarts use to gain a foothold in an established market is as 
readily available to the market leaders, if not more so. The incumbents’ expertise in the 
field should translate to an incredible advantage compared to new players that are just 
now becoming acquainted with the market, and the few that are succeeding in staying a 
step ahead are doing so through a high rate of productivity and differentiation through 
innovation (Schmidt and Porteus 2000), as seen with Apple, Samsung, and other 
technology giants that update their software and hardware offerings on annual cycles to 
stay ahead of their competitors own competitive innovations. However, as this research 
shows, there are certain attributes of an organization’s KM system that can work against 
it when improperly applied, and that certain organizational structures require 
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implementation of command and control (C2) attributes to ensure that individuals are 
able to coordinate internally toward desired results. 
The organization of this research is as follows: the subsections in this chapter 
elaborate on the problem on which this thesis will focus, postulate a proposed solution, 
and briefly explain how this solution would meet the need. The second chapter discusses 
the fundamental concepts and theories that form the basis of this research, including 
knowledge management, organizational theory and design, and how organizational self-
awareness is the key of knowledge superiority. The third chapter elaborates on the 
analysis of Creative Destruction in spite of the KM and C2 systems and theories designed 
to mitigate it, explaining how four attributes of organizational self-awareness are critical 
to mitigate the risk of Creative Destruction. The fourth chapter lays out the architectural 
conceptualization of a KM system, which addresses the necessary functions from the 
third chapter, and describes the analysis of alternatives and selection criteria for the 
proposed KM system. The final chapter summarizes the key findings and limitations of 
this research, and lists areas for further study, including design and implementation of 
such a system, refinement of the research with feedback from said implementation, and 
potential expansion of the scope of the research into the relationship between 
organizational self-awareness and knowledge superiority. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis looks at the inconsistency between competitive advantage through 
knowledge and the fall of market leaders to upstarts in both private markets and public 
fields. It evaluates the main premise of knowledge management is that knowledge is a 
source of competitive advantage (Porter and Millar 1985). More knowledge translates to 
more competitive advantage, which would then mean that market leaders, assumed to 
have the most knowledge and the resources to get even more, should be safe atop of the 
market. In both public and private markets, however, leaders constantly fall to smaller 
and/or newer organizations that have a lower level of knowledge than the leader(s) do. 
A problem, by definition, is to know that something needs to be done but cannot 
be done now, and not knowing how to achieve what needs to be done (Langford 2012). 
Creative Destruction, described by the term’s creator as industrial mutation “that 
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incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the 
old one, incessantly creating a new one” which “is the essential fact about capitalism” 
(Schumpeter 2008, 83), is a problem for market leaders in every field. That the term 
greatly predates the Information Age indicates this problem affects several fields 
regardless of their nature or sophistication. 
The knowledge management field addresses competitive advantage through 
knowledge power and knowledge uniqueness (Nissen 2014). Knowledge power increases 
through acquisition and dissemination of that knowledge throughout the organization to 
duplicate success, emulate best practices, and increase competitive advantage (Szulanski 
and Winter 2002; Hatch and Dyer 2004). It also increases its ability to flow, since as the 
desired recipients’ absorption of new knowledge depends on the knowledge they already 
possess (Tuomi 1999; Alavi and Leidner 2001). In other words, the term “transfer of 
knowledge” can be a misnomer, since it is not exactly knowledge that flows, but signals 
generated by and based on the teacher’s knowledge that are interpreted based on the 
learner’s knowledge (Nissen 2006; Shattuck and Miller 2006). This flow process 
emphasizes the advantage through knowledge superiority. It maximizes the power of an 
organization’s knowledge while protecting it from Creative Destruction through 
imitation, and it leverages the depths of the knowledge advantage of incumbency. This 
helps create knowledge flows that prioritize the knowledge that is key to the 
organization’s value proposition to the market.  
Knowledge uniqueness increases, or is protected, via controlled or limited access, 
appropriation, and key employee retention (Saviotti 1998; Partnership for Public Service 
2011; Madsen, Mosakowski and Zaheer 2002; McAusland and Kuhn 2011). It is the basis 
of critical differentiation for a market leader to retain or expand its competitive advantage 
(Porter 1996). 
Both knowledge power and uniqueness are critical to maintain competitive 
advantage, but their relationship is paradoxically inverse. The steps that are necessary to 
increase one, in most cases, cause the other to diminish; thus, it is common for 
organizations to find themselves sacrificing power for uniqueness or vice versa, which 
ultimately leads to losing market share. Most of the literature dealing with this paradox 
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recommend either to give up on uniqueness and focus on excellence of duplication 
(Szulanski and Jensen 2008; Winter 2000), or to maximize uniqueness via innovation or 
combination of product and corporate processes at the expense of duplication of success 
(Schoemaker and Gunther 2006; Saviotti 1998; Hargadon and Sutton 2000).  
The following four statements summarize the problem this thesis addresses: 
• Market leaders build what should be a near-insurmountable competitive 
advantage in their market due to their greater knowledge assets, yet they 
constantly fall to less-knowledgeable organizations. 
• It is very difficult to increase the power of an organization’s knowledge 
without compromising its uniqueness or vice versa, which means that 
there usually is an inherent weakness in KM systems that leads to the 
continuous cycle of Creative Destruction. 
• Organizational structures require a specific means of coordination to 
succeed. These means relate directly to KM methodology, but are rarely 
analyzed this way, creating a separate weakness in the system via misfit 
with the organization’s structure. 
• There are organizational structures that require standardization of results 
as a means of coordination for a proper fit, such as adhocracies and 
divisionalized bureaucracies. This creates an additional challenge for the 
KM system to ensure SMEs and other individuals responsible for 
achieving said results to develop and evaluate their decision-making 
ability as a key element of their competency. 
C. PROPOSAL 
This study will challenge the reader to rethink the path to KS in five critical areas 
of organizational self-awareness: 
• Knowledge completeness. Has the organization analyzed its successes and 
failures from a KM perspective to understand all the relevant internal and 
external factors that worked together for the initiative’s outcome? Is its 
success by deliberate design or by a happy coincidence? Does it 
understand the risk of gaps between what key workers’ know and what 
they need to know to make good decisions?  
• Knowledge baselines. Does the organization know how much and which 
knowledge their key employees have at the individual or group level? Has 
the gap between complete knowledge and each person’s/group’s 
knowledge been analyzed? Can it be? 
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• Knowledge prioritization. Is there a systematic approach to achieve 
complete knowledge depending on each individual’s/group’s baseline of 
knowledge? Is it flexible to adapt to different knowledge bases? Is there a 
priority level assigned to different parts of the knowledge that individuals 
and/or groups need to have? 
• Organizational purpose. Does the design of the organization serve its 
strategic goals? Does its KM system and methodology fit and support the 
organizational goals and design? Does the organization prepare and 
empower individuals to achieve desired results regardless of where they 
are in the organization? Is there a system to determine when this is 
desirable? 
• Individual decision-making processes. Do key knowledge workers have 
supporting systems to filter from the universe of signals and data to a 
manageable set of information to make informed decisions? Does the 
organization have mechanisms in place to train and evaluate these key 
decision makers? Do they know how their decisions affect the ability of 
the organization to deliver consistency of results? 
This thesis proposes a combination of knowledge management, organizational 
design, team cognition, and decision-making concepts to design a system that can 
increase knowledge power without sacrificing its uniqueness. This system would analyze 
the organization’s successful initiatives and use their functional decompositions to 
duplicate successes in situations where exact duplication is not a fitting means of 
coordination. This allows the organization to evaluate its design based on its strategic 
goals, and to identify the best KM methodology for that structure.  
The research here is a starting point. One goal of this path of research is to design 
KM systems that identify, catalog, test, and prioritize knowledge so that it does not just 
flow to the appropriate people and systems in the organization but that it is the 
appropriate and relevant knowledge that needs to flow. Another goal is to help 
organizations, particularly large ones, see that the path to competitive advantage does not 
necessarily rely on standardization of as many processes as possible, but rather of the 
fewest to allow the high-priced SMEs on its staff to use their expertise to deliver desired 
results. This is particularly relevant for public sector organizations and their auditors, as 
they tend to focus on process compliance as the measure of effectiveness with only a 
passing regard for the quality and consistency of results. 
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The analysis will look at the current state of organizational KM and C2 systems 
and organizational theory, analyze their functions, and identify the needs that they 
address as well as those that remain, even after their implementation. It will evaluate the 
impact and viability of adjusting or overhauling organizations’ KM systems and 
methodologies, and propose tools and applications to help leaders and managers 
determine how to assess their effectiveness, particularly how they support the 
organizational strategic goals and competitive advantages 
Each of the proposed areas of improvement require the organization to look 
inwardly. There are principles and theories that focus on areas outside the organization, 
which could be as impactful to its competitive advantage, but this thesis is concerned 
with the organization’s self-awareness. The reason is that nothing is as demoralizing at all 
levels in a successful organization than self-inflicted wounds. Even the best organizations 
can lose sight of who and what they are, ending up in a situation much like Blackberry, 
whose leaders to this day cannot believe that Apple, and now Samsung and Google, 
overtook them with clunky, inefficient, and flashy cell phones with weak security 
features. They cannot understand how, while the public cannot understand their 
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II. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS 
This chapter provides an overview of knowledge management, knowledge 
superiority, and a definition of Organizational Self-Awareness. It elaborates on current 
organizational KM systems, their purpose, and the need they address in their design and 
implementation, with a review of the value proposition that such systems offer 
organizations that incorporate them. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader a summary of the KM 
discipline, major aspects and attributes of knowledge and systems of knowledge, and a 
framework to analyze the effectiveness of KM systems. It provides the rationale to 
choose the proper measures to evaluate KM systems’ strengths and weaknesses with 
respect to their most overarching goal of knowledge superiority, which is to leverage 
organizational knowledge into sustainable, competitive advantages that protect leading 
organizations from Creative Destruction. 
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW 
Organizational self-awareness is the firm’s perception of what it knows and what 
it needs to know, both institutionally and as a sum of individuals’ knowledge. The 
purpose of the focus on it is to demonstrate that decisions by leaders and lower-level 
decision makers can affect the organization’s current and potential success regardless of 
external factors that are outside their control. Some obvious answers may require more 
scrutiny, and it is important for leaders to understand that their time would be well-spent 
making internal organizational decisions with careful consideration of the impact they 
can have on strategic and tactical goals. 
In the framework of Team Cognition, theorists treat organizations as teams 
instead of groups, as the heterogeneous nature of organizations is one of the key 
challenges that the design of the proposed KM system addresses (Cooke, Gorman, and 
Winner 2007). The degree to which the organization is able to overcome this challenge 
will be a major factor in determining the impact of OSA on knowledge superiority and 
competitive advantages. 
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As the complexity of organizations increases, the organization’s total knowledge 
level separates from the sum of the knowledge of the individuals in the organization 
(Cooke, Gorman, and Winner 2007). In some cases, the total exceeds the sum, while in 
many others, it is substantially less. The goal is always to increase the level, and hence 
the power, of an organization’s knowledge. Evaluating whether an OSA factor causes the 
total knowledge to exceed the sum of individuals’ knowledge, as opposed to merely 
increasing that total, is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The awareness portion of OSA would consist of these five parts:  
• understanding what the individuals and the organization must know to be 
knowledgeable  
• knowing what each individual knows as it relates to the organization’s 
goals, and his or her impact on them  
• realizing how to build from the organization’s knowledge assets to the 
required knowledge level  
• understanding how the organization’s structure must dictate its KM 
methodology for a proper and effective fit 
• determining how far to delegate and disseminate the responsibility of 
making critical decisions, which depends on that KM methodology  
Achieving OSA requires that the firm decompose its vision, mission, and each of 
its initiatives. This decomposition reveals the knowledge chunks that contributed to the 
successes, along with the chunks that were missing from its failures, and helps establish a 
continuous knowledge assessment mechanism that tests both the level of knowledge of 
the individuals in the firm and the relevance of the knowledge chunks identified in the 
organization’s own assessment. This would be akin to an information-processing 
subsystem (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011) in systems engineering design but with a 
focus on the knowledge chunks and their dissemination via the information and data bits. 
Therefore, organizational self-awareness would be the result of implementing KM 
and C2 systems and organizational theories that leverage the analysis of successful 
initiatives to duplicate success and mitigate the risk of Creative Destruction. This 
involves a deeper study of innovations to assess not just their strengths but their 
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weaknesses as well, and anticipate how a competitor may successfully counter them, 
which is an important attribute for a KM system that intends to meet this need. 
There are several disciplines and theories with extensive research regarding both 
knowledge management and command and control. This general overview section 
discusses three major concepts that are the pillars behind this thesis, and their relation to 
the ultimate goal of knowledge superiority. This thesis proposes adjustments and 
enhancements to the design of the KM discipline itself, leveraging knowledge flow and 
C2 principles to create a system that increases knowledge power while protecting 
knowledge uniqueness. These concepts are critical to the premise of the thesis. 
1. Knowledge Management 
Knowledge management relates to the acquisition, accumulation, assessment, 
dissemination, and institutionalization of knowledge assets in an organization. Because 
knowledge is akin to competitive advantage (DeLong, Lees and Gabarro 2008; Dierickx 
and Cool 1989; Hatch and Dyer 2004; Nissen 2006; Porter and Millar 1985; Madsen, 
Mosakowski and Zaheer 2002), the value proposition of the KM field is to provide 
organizations competitive advantages that are sustainable, protecting the organization’s 
market share and helping it expand it. The subsections below explain the functions of 
KM and their contribution to meeting the need. 
a. Knowledge Power 
The main purpose of KM is to maintain competitive advantage (Porter and Millar 
1985). Whether by duplication of successful endeavors (Szulanski and Winter 2002), 
accumulation of knowledge assets (Dierickx and Cool 1989), or by profitable innovation 
(Andrew and Sirkin 2004), to know more is generally synonymous with gaining value. 
Therefore, knowledge management initiatives are measured not just by their efficiency of 
knowledge attainment and transferring, but also in terms of how that knowledge increases 
an individual’s or an organization’s value. 
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b. Knowledge Uniqueness 
Competitive advantage in this context is when an organization can do something 
of value in its market better than its competitors (Porter and Millar 1985). Knowledge 
management initiatives have mostly focused on technological or process knowledge to 
deliver product that is better or cheaper to produce than what is currently available 
(Schmidt and Porteus 2000). Both externally and internally, KM leads and/or manages 
technological changes, which, if they are better than the competition’s, can gain it a 
competitive advantage (Porter 1985). Differentiation from the competition as a 
competitive advantage is the external measure of KM success. Internally, the measure of 
KM success takes the form of process improvement, codification of tacit knowledge, 
dissemination throughout the organization, refinement of the newly acquired knowledge, 
and ultimately its penetration on all relevant parts of the organization (Nissen 2006). The 
leveraging of this flow of knowledge, expected to lead to more effective innovation and 
technological improvement of product and/or process that creates competitive advantage, 
is the internal measure of KM success. 
c. Knowledge Flow 
Assessments are a key element of KM application. They allow an organization to 
both quantify and qualify its knowledge assets and its gaps in knowledge, which help the 
organization’s leaders make decisions about where knowledge needs to flow. The results 
show the need to create and apply new knowledge, and to find the most effective flow 
path to achieve the desired explicitness, reach, and maturity to achieve the organization’s 
strategic goals (Nissen 2014).  
d. Knowledge Classifications 
Knowledge is largely classified as either experiential and tacit or as codified and 
explicit (Nissen 2014), at the individual or organizational level. Explicit knowledge is the 
easiest to disseminate and standardize, which makes it better for knowledge flow 
purposes but also risks the competitive advantage that the knowledge provides since it 
can flow both internally and toward competitors (Saviotti 1998). Management must 
evaluate the risk-reward ratio of losing the competitive advantage compared with the 
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efficiency and effectiveness gains within the organization due to the knowledge flowing 
well. Additional benefits of codifying knowledge come from the codification process 
itself, as management makes important decisions about compliance, repeatability, and 
standardization (Winter 2000).  
Tacit knowledge, conversely, is difficult to disseminate, and even more so to 
standardize. Subject matter experts (SMEs) hold this knowledge in their own heads, and 
articulating it is very difficult to accomplish fully since so many parts of that knowledge 
are second nature to the SME, sometimes without her realizing that what she does 
naturally is instrumental to the total body of that knowledge (Leonard and Sensiper 
1998). It is founded on experience. At the same time, it is the most valuable kind of 
knowledge for the firm, and it is the best source of its competitive advantage. It is the 
hardest to duplicate, the source of all explicit knowledge, and it greatly increases the 
ability to absorb more and better knowledge to expand the advantage (Looney and Nissen 
2007). 
2. Command and Control and Organizational Theory
Command and Control, as its name implies, focuses on singular decision-making 
processes at the top of an organization. The following subsections elaborate on the C2 
principles this thesis leverages for analysis and recommendations: decision making and 
organizational design. 
a. Decision Making
     Success in an organization is ultimately the result of good decision making. 
Qualifying the goodness of a decision, however, generally happens in hindsight. 
Even the best-trained leaders can make mistakes, and much the more if the leader’s 
perception of a certain situation does not come into sync with reality (Coakley 
1992, 95–122). That leader’s perception is in turn a function of her experiences and 
personal tendencies, combined with the data and information that she can and does 
access when making a decision. She then proceeds through the Naturalistic Decision 
Making (NDM) process to arrive at the best decision. 
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The steps of NDM are essentially going from all the information available, to 
what can be detected, to what is displayed to the commander, to what the commander 
sees, understands, and ultimately projects as the likely outcome of the choices at his or 
her disposal. Once one of the projections fits the commander’s vision of a desirable 
outcome, it determines the doctrine and actions for the forces under his or her command 
(Shattuck and Miller 2006).  
Situated cognition, as a part of NDM, refers to the “interplay of multiple 
individuals and their environment” which plays a determinant role in an individual’s 
decision-making process. It helps explain how the decision maker must not only be 
prepared and trained to make the best decisions, but must take steps toward ensuring that 
she is fully aware of all the factors in the environment that are impactful to the decision.  
Of course, knowing what one needs to know without learning everything else is a 
near impossibility, more so in situations where others are responsible for filtering the 
environment for the leader to absorb only the “important” information. Shattuck and 
Miller (2006) use the complex scenario of military operations, particularly a deadly 
collision at sea with a Japanese fishing vessel, to illustrate how operators and information 
technology were unable to prevent a trained and competent leader from making a terrible 
mistake. Their illustration of this process is in Figure 2–1, with the filtering mechanisms 
being sensors and their operators, neither of which are trained to make the command 
decisions, but are tasked with deciding for the commander what he needs to know. This 
inconsistency of having less-trained individuals and IT systems make information-
discrimination decisions is a critical weakness of modern C2 systems, and usually is at 
the core of many recent military disasters, such as the USS GREENVILLE (SSN 772) 




Figure 2-1. Naturalistic Decision Making—Dynamic Model of Situated 
Cognition with Feedback Loops Representing Decisions That Have Been 
Made and Their Impact. 
 
This Situated Cognition illustration indicates how the decision maker’s information flow 
goes from all the data that exists down to the data that sensors can detect and the data that 
the system discriminates as important, based on programming. The lenses (A, B, C) 
represent the impact that the decision maker’s mind (experiences, perception, 
physiological and psychological conditions) has on the data and what he gains from it. 
The final lens is a representation of how the decision maker forecasts the result of the 
options being considered, and selects the one that best fits the desired result. From 
Shattuck, Lawrence G, and Nita Lewis Miller. 2006. “Extending Naturalistic Decision 
Making to Complex Organizations: A Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition.” 
Organization Studies 27 (7): 1–21. 
Outside of military or other high-tech operations, public and private organizations 
go through the same decision making and information-discrimination processes. Instead 
of sensors, they may have market research data, “metrics,” or business-unit performance 
standards designed to filter through large amounts of data and information and facilitate 
decision making at the most senior leadership levels. The principles remain the same, as 
do the contradictory weaknesses of having less-trained individuals making critical 
decisions for the well-trained executive leader, potentially guiding or bounding the 
decisions the leader makes.  
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While these limitations are inevitable in any organization, there is much room for 
improving an organization’s chances for success based on decision making. Some 
involve better filtering mechanisms for the right information and data to reach leadership, 
or better training the leaders to anticipate a particular quantity or quality of information 
and drive the performance of filtering operations to meet the standard. Situated cognition, 
as an extension of NDM, illustrates the need for these measures to achieve better 
performance. Another way that C2 theories promote better organizational performance is 
through the design of the organization itself, particularly as it relates to the strategic goals 
of the organization. 
b. Organizational Design 
Another critical attribute to consider is the design of the organization, especially 
as it relates to the strategic goals and purposes of the organization. Numerous well-
documented organizational failure “stem from the assumption that organizations are all 
alike: mere collections of component parts to which elements of structure can be added 
and deleted at will, a sort of organizational bazaar” (Mintzberg 1981, 103). Conversely, 
Mintzberg continues, “effective organizations achieve a coherence among their 
component parts, that they do not change one element without considering the 
consequences to” the other parts of the organization (Mintzberg 1981, 103).  
A key element of Mintzberg’s work (1981) is the cataloguing of the various 
organizational structures based on the desired means of coordination. The KM 
methodology as determined by its goals corresponds to a specific means of coordination, 
which itself requires a specific organizational structure to be successful. If one takes 
Szulanski’s (2002, 2008) franchise model approach of exact duplication of successful 
working templates, the appropriate means of coordination is the standardization of work, 
which fits a machine bureaucracy. If instead one heeds Black and Morrison’s (2010) 
warning not to devote oneself to The Way, but instead seek to coordinate through 
standardization of results or mutual SME adjustment, the appropriate structure is either a 
divisionalized bureaucracy or an adhocracy. Foregoing KM altogether works in very 
simple structures, while highly complex and sophisticated organizations, which 
Mintzberg names adhocracies, coordinate via mutual adjustment, driving innovation and 
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depending on the expertise of the specialist to go beyond their specific field into 
understanding how the rest of the organization works and how to communicate 
effectively to collaborate at an effective pace.  
The challenge for leaders seeking knowledge superiority is to decide how they 
would like to coordinate the work of their organizations, examine their current structures, 
and determine which KM strategy fits their organization best. Conversely, they may 
evaluate their current structure and analyze trade-offs between adapting to a different 
structure or a different form of knowledge management to ensure a proper fit.  
3. Knowledge Superiority 
In its brochure for the Knowledge Superiority Certificate program, the Naval 
Postgraduate School defines knowledge superiority as the leveraging of “sustainable, 
knowledge-based, competitive advantages” that come from the “integration of people, 
processes, organizations and technology” that drive knowledge to flow to where the 
organization needs it to be (Naval Postgraduate School 2015). Knowledge Flow Theory 
describes knowledge flow as it goes from tacit to explicit and back, from an individual-
level to organization-wide, and how it matures from its creation to its application, with 
the added dimension of time for each knowledge flow process (Nissen 2006). Nissen 
(2006) leverages the theory to illustrate and analyze the direction, speed, and 
effectiveness of this knowledge flow as a key measure of an organization’s competitive 
advantage through knowledge superiority.  
The concept serves the purpose of this thesis well. Knowledge may be the key for 
competitive advantage, but superiority, by definition, speaks to its sustainability. The 
efforts described in the upcoming chapters all drive toward the singular goal of 
knowledge superiority. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The current-state organizational KM systems focus on organization-level tools 
and initiatives to disseminate and protect knowledge looking while treating the 
organization as a singular entity, or a system of smaller knowledge systems and players, 
with the emphasis on the organization.  
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This section elaborates on the design and value proposition of organizational KM 
systems in their current state, addressing their functional decomposition, needs analysis, 
and knowledge flows to deliver its value proposition to the organizations that implement it. 
1. Purpose of Current Organizational KM System 
The purpose of organizational KM is two-fold: maximize both knowledge power 
and knowledge uniqueness. The power of knowledge allows organizations to duplicate 
their best practices and successes both internally and externally (Nonaka 1994; Szulanski 
and Winter 2002; Nissen 2014), while the uniqueness of that knowledge protects the 
organization from knowledge-based competition through imitation (Saviotti 1998).  
Because knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge, is the more powerful 
contributor to an organization’s competitive advantage, driving innovation and 
differentiation, managing, protecting, and disseminating that knowledge is imperative for 
market-leading organizations to keep or even to expand their lead (Dierickx and Cool 
1989). Tacit knowledge is more powerful, but it is sticky and requires deliberate effort for 
it to flow to where needed (von Hippel 1994).  
At the same time, organizational KM must also protect the uniqueness of that 
knowledge to protect the organization from competition from imitation. As tacit 
knowledge becomes more explicit and disseminated, it is more difficult to keep it from 
competitors that could use it to overtake the organization (Porter 1985).  
Nissen (2014) elaborates on the functions and application of KM systems and 
programs. He establishes attributes of knowledge itself, knowledge flow, knowledge 
transfer, and the increasing power and decreasing uniqueness of knowledge as it diffuses 
throughout the organization. It transitions from tacit to explicit, and then back to tacit at 
the organizational, refined level, where it maximizes its power again, but with reduced 
uniqueness. 
2. Functional Decomposition 
The need that organizational KM was designed to fulfill was to leverage 
knowledge as the source of sustainable, competitive advantage (Porter and Millar 1985). 
It does so by extracting and disseminating the organization’s clumps of tacit knowledge 
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based on a targeted level of knowledge that the leaders of the organization decide is 
necessary to maximize that competitive advantage. Knowledge Flow Analysis evaluates 
the dimensions of knowledge and the paths to maximize its dissemination throughout the 
organization to minimize the vulnerabilities that threaten organizations’ ability to sustain 
their competitive advantage (Nissen 2010).  
Figure 2-2 illustrates the different attributes or organizational KM systems as 
they exist today. These attributes are applicable to both the current state of KM systems 
and the proposed design that this thesis elaborates in following chapters, particularly 
metacognition and knowledge uniqueness. 
Figure 2-2. Functional Decomposition of Current-State Organizational 
KM Systems. 
3. Current-State Functional Analysis
Table 1 takes the organizational needs that the KM system is designed to address, 
and indicates the functions of the system that address them directly, with a short 
requirements statement that explains what the system must do and why. 
24 
Table 1.   Current State KM Functional Analysis. 





Incorporate processes to increase the accumulation of 
its knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge, via 
recruiting or training/mentoring. This accumulation 
represents the ceiling of individual knowledge, and 





Evaluate successes, and transmit the knowledge behind 
them throughout the organization. Once the 
organization knows what it did to be successful, it must 
codify it and transfer it to other parts of its organization 







Protect key advantageous knowledge from competition 
by controlling access to it. As tacit knowledge becomes 
more codified and diffused throughout the 
organization, it is easier for competitors to copy and 








Identify knowledge gaps at the individual and 
team/group levels, quantify the value for the current 
and desired knowledge in the organization, and develop 
the proper transmission tools to close the identified 
gaps in order of value for the organization.  
4. Knowledge Flows
As illustrated in Figure 2-3, Nissen (2006) employs a multidimensional 
visualization to illustrate how knowledge matures and disseminates throughout an 
organization, transforming from tacit to explicit, and back to tacit. He adds a time 
dimension to show how long knowledge takes to travel/flow from one three-dimensional 
form to the next. 
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Figure 2-3. Multidimensional Knowledge-Flow Visualization. 
 
Knowledge begins (A) as a clump of tacit knowledge newly created/acquired by the 
SME. The SME, using tacit training tools such as mentoring and hands-on training (Swap 
W. L. 2001), socializes (organizes, formalizes and shares) still-tacit knowledge to a group 
level (B), slowly. The group slowly externalizes (codifies and formalizes) as much of that 
tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge as possible (C), and quickly combines it at the 
organizational level (D). The organization then slowly internalizes the explicit knowledge 
into tacit, refined, organizational knowledge (E), where it slowly socializes it again with 
much more power. From Nissen, Mark E. 2006. Harnessing Knowledge Dynamics: 
Principled Organizational Knowing and Learning. Hershey, PA: IRM Press. 
There are other paths for knowledge flow, particularly to overcome organization-
specific barriers to flow, or to accommodate for different types of knowledge refinement 
and dissemination, that may necessitate alternate paths.  
5. Value Proposition 
In practical terms, the KM programs in many organizations today consist of 
acquiring SMEs that are full of relevant tacit knowledge, complementing that core of 
experience with junior and mid-level personnel, and creating flow paths for that 
knowledge to go from where it is to where it is needed (Hatch and Dyer 2004; Nissen and 
Levitt 2004). The programs then use a combination of training sessions, mentoring, 
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knowledge sharing networks, and process analysis to understand and codify that tacit 
knowledge to disseminate throughout the organization (Swap, et al. 2001; Nissen 2006).  
Organizational KM leads to more collaboration and efficient utilization of 
knowledge asset stocks, better prioritization of training needs, and less duplicative efforts 
within organizations. However, Creative Destruction remains as much a threat to market 
leading organizations as ever. The balance between knowledge power and knowledge 
uniqueness remains elusive, with market leadership shifting between organizations, or 
taken by an upstart that leverages the codified knowledge that the leaders have in 
abundance.  
In the following chapters, this thesis will propose adjustments in organizational 




III. ORGANIZATIONAL SELF-AWARENESS RELATION TO 
KNOWLEDGE SUPERIORITY 
The previous two chapters introduced the problems facing knowledge-based 
market leaders and players and how KM and C2 disciplines have addressed the problem. 
Chapter I discussed how Creative Destruction seems to fly in the face of the competitive 
advantage that knowledge provides for an organization, especially since market leaders 
and main players have access to more and better knowledge than the upstarts that keep 
overtaking them. Chapter II elaborates on how the knowledge management disciplines 
have addressed the issues of increasing both knowledge power and knowledge 
uniqueness, with the goal of maximizing competitive advantage while minimizing the 
risk of competition through imitation, including how knowledge assessments and flow 
theory work to take knowledge from tacit and individual-based to explicit, disseminated, 
and finally tacit and organizational-based. 
This chapter analyzes the current state of organizational KM systems, and 
explains how there is an important piece that has gotten little attention in theory and in 
practice. That element involves a combination of two initiatives within an organization: 
(1) decomposing the organization’s knowledge, particularly about its successes, to 
understand exactly why and how the success occurred, and (2) developing a precise 
knowledge base for each position in the organization that allows it to disseminate the 
appropriate amount of knowledge to each individual, while not disseminating so much 
that one compromises uniqueness.  
A. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
As discussed in the previous chapters, market leaders are constantly under 
pressure to increase their lead through additional competitive advantages. This lead 
comes from accumulating expert knowledge through recruiting and internal research, 
assessing the knowledge levels of each person in the organization compared with a 
standard of knowledge for the organization, finding the clumps of relevant, powerful, 
tacit knowledge and disseminating it through the organization. The ultimate benefit is the 
replication and even improvement of the successes that the organization has achieved. 
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Disseminating the knowledge requires making it portable. The advantage that 
comes from being able to transmit it across the organization also presents a susceptibility 
to imitation. However, protecting the knowledge and access to it hinders the ability to 
duplicate success, so these two forces work against each other. 
The Creative Destruction comes from either another organization achieving the 
steps above in a more effective way, or leveraging the leaders’ portable knowledge 
toward a better or more cost effective product to take market share away. The same 
process that the market leaders use to overtake their competitors is used against them, and 
the Creative Destruction process continues. For a KM system to meet the needs of 
knowledge accumulation, dissemination, and uniqueness while not compromising 
uniqueness, certain adjustments in the approach to organizational KM are in order. 
B. DUPLICATION CHALLENGES  
Szulanski and Winter (2002), Black and Morrison (2010), and others illustrate the 
benefits and elusiveness of duplicating success. The challenges that they find in their 
research all come down to a single point of failure: the codification of the tacit 
knowledge behind the success was incomplete. Duplication efforts often underestimate 
the amount and type of knowledge chunks that were critical toward building the 
successful innovations the firms had built, or overestimating their understanding of what 
worked and why. Moreover, because duplication becomes the goal, the organization 
institutionalizes inherent weaknesses in its initiatives and permeates their effect 
throughout as part of the knowledge flow process.  
In their 2010 study of Japanese firms exporting The Way, Black and Morrison 
elaborate on this last point when they evaluate how these firms believed that the entirety 
of their management and operations system was successful as a whole. Their faith in The 
Way as a whole led them to forego decomposing their successes to find precisely why 
and how each functional component of their initiative(s) succeeded or failed, which 
would have shown them the structural weaknesses of their system (Black and Morrison 
2010). They summarized these weaknesses into four, applicable to companies looking to 
expand beyond their market or niche: 
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• Devotion to The Way: A strong belief in the strength of the system as a 
whole 
• Isolated Domestic Market: Their faith is protected due to lack of 
competitive challenges in their local market, reinforcing their belief in the 
system 
• Docile (or more broadly, homogeneous) Domestic Labor Force: The less 
diversity in the workforce, the easier for management to develop a single 
management system that works throughout the organization, further 
reinforcing faith in the system  
• Homogeneous Senior Leaders: Similar to the previous point, when the 
executive team as a whole tends toward the same decisions and 
conclusions, most decisions seem brilliant, and the strength of the system 
becomes self-reinforcing 
Szulanski and Winter (2002) are blunter in their assessment from the introductory 
statement: “In-house ‘experts’ don’t truly know why [the best practice] worked in the 
first place.” Using Starbucks and McDonald’s as contrasting examples, they illustrate the 
difficulty of understanding on what a company’s competitive advantage is based.  
When Starbucks executives first looked to establish the company’s identity, they 
tried perfect copies of what its leadership viewed as critical elements of successful Italian 
cafés that they sought to emulate and failed. McDonald’s tried the opposite approach 
when they started seeking to expand globally, adapting its model and practices in a way 
its executives perceived would be well received by the countries into which they were 
expanding. In this case, this approach was also a disaster.  
Each of these companies then decided to try an approach to their desired 
expansion that was essentially what the other had tried and failed. Starbucks’ 
management decided that they should adapt their model to the culture to which they were 
marketing, in this case Americans, implementing successful principles they had seen in 
those other cafes at a functional level. When they did, they found success at a grand 
scale, and that success was ready for exact duplication. They were not ready to copy 
exactly when they first tried, but they certainly are now. Conversely, McDonald’s already 
had an excellent working template that should have been duplicated exactly, but did not 
realize it, and tried to adjust it unnecessarily. When they decided to copy exactly, they 
succeeded. However, their adaptation to cultural differences in new markets caused 
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McDonald’s to fail internationally. The pure American model would have been, and 
ultimately was successful globally (Szulanski and Winter 2002). 
In the end, each of them essentially tried the other’s failed approach and 
succeeded. This is yet another illustration that the KM methodology needs to adapt to the 
appropriate organizational structure. There is no one “best” methodology, though exact 
copying seems to be one that makes innate sense to many business leaders and managers.  
This contrasting example also serves to illustrate an additional point, one that 
Szulanski continues to elaborate in follow-on research: innovation and duplication cannot 
be achieved at the same time (Szulanski and Jensen 2008). Organizations need to choose, 
even if it is at the business unit/agency, which one they are going to pursue. In this 
example, Starbucks was in the innovation stage, while McDonald’s was mostly at the 
duplication stage; it took these failures to get them to understand this. 
Szulanski’s focus is on duplication, and the two papers cited above encourage the 
reader to adopt a “Copy Exactly!” method as a way to ensure success and troubleshoot 
duplication failures with a current, living template of a working process. This has the 
effect of duplicating the success, done correctly, but does little to address the analysis of 
the success at its own functional, decomposed level. It works when the working template 
is robust and well-understood, as long as this KM methodology fits the structure of the 
organization. 
C. DECOMPOSITION OF SUCCESS 
While many organizations are actively working to help knowledge flow to where 
it is needed, the path to knowledge superiority assumes that the knowledge to be 
transmitted is well-defined and essentially complete. There is little in the KM literature 
that discusses the evaluation of this premise.  
This thesis proposes a process that precedes the need for duplication, focusing on 
understanding success at the functional level. Decomposing success would be a part of 
the innovation process itself, so that when one is successful, it is the result of a deliberate 
process. This decomposition involves not only understanding how success was built, but 
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also understanding which part of the knowledge behind the success is necessary at the 
individual level for all the people who make decisions in the organization. 
The reason for this focus on decomposing success is the fundamental premise 
behind this thesis: that the competitive advantage of an organization, particularly one that 
has gained market share through innovation, must shift from the innovation itself to the 
process of innovation. This allows the organization to codify as much of the knowledge 
as necessary as it relates to the innovation, while protecting itself from imitation taking 
its biggest competitive advantage. Additionally, by decomposing successful operations 
and initiatives, the organization is able to better assess, acquire, and allocate knowledge 
throughout the organization based on what the organization has determined is needed to 
achieve success.  
The process of determining what is needed to succeed is the elusive goal behind 
duplication efforts, such as those mentioned already in the preceding chapters. Many of 
the theories to increase knowledge power through flow and dissemination conclude that 
either complete duplication or functional adaptation of successful working templates are 
the means to achieve this (Szulanski and Winter 2002; Szulanski and Jensen 2008; Black 
and Morrison 2010). Both duplication and adaptation, however, take for granted that 
decomposing successful initiatives to determine how each of their individual functional 
components contribute to the success of the whole. Based on the research in support of 
this thesis, it is very difficult to understand why something works once it is already 
working, and more so to be sure that all the components of success are understood. If any 
part of the whole is missing, the entire initiative would fail, even if the missing part is an 
adaptation to transfer the success to another market or country (Black and Morrison 
2010), which makes the “Copy Exactly!” strategy a most sensible way to duplicate 
success (Szulanski and Winter 2002).  
Therefore, one of the key elements of this thesis is to decompose success as it is 
built. Successful innovation is rare but very valuable (Andrew and Sirkin 2004), and it 
takes a concerted investment by organizations to do this, especially since many of the 
decompositions will be on initiatives that will lead to nothing in terms of return. That is 
not to say that there is no value in failures or learning from them, as there are strong 
 32 
arguments to the return on investment of mistakes, going so far as to say that there is so 
much value that companies should be willing to make deliberate mistakes (Schoemaker 
and Gunther 2006).  
The improvement in this allocation of knowledge, in which the flow is limited to 
precisely what individuals need to know based on their position in the organization, 
prevents individuals from being able to transfer important knowledge to competitors. It 
empowers those same individuals to make decisions that align with the organization’s 
strategic goals and key elements of success it is looking to replicate, and prevents 
employees from getting overwhelmed with unnecessary knowledge. By tailoring the 
employees’ training to what each of them needs to know, and illustrating to employees 
their knowledge gaps and the specific training to address those gaps, organizations get the 
additional benefit of motivation from the employees to learn the material that they need 
and nothing else. 
D. TAILORING OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN AND KM CONCEPTS 
The preceding chapters and sections elaborate on the need to disseminate 
knowledge and to keep it protected from imitation. Current KM and C2 theories address 
this need, but most of the solutions deal with the organization as a singular entity, with a 
capable leader and information systems designed to feed said leader with the information 
to make the best decisions possible (Coakley 1992). The organization trains its leaders to 
make the best decisions based on the organization’s strategic goals, to which those 
leaders are usually an important contributor. The organization trains its workforce as a 
whole to a certain baseline of knowledge throughout, with specialized training for 
positions with unique and known skill requirements. The codified knowledge that is the 
basis for competitive advantage is protected, with access limited to prevent losses. 
Tailoring those same tools and techniques for individual worker and position in 
the organization addresses the concerns of the KM paradox mentioned earlier in three 
ways: 
• It increases the power of the organization’s knowledge while divorcing it 
from the product or system it is developing. The firm uses the improved 
understanding of the factors and functions behind its successes to allocate 
knowledge requirements at the individual/position level in a discretionary 
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way to avoid allowing individuals to have enough explicit knowledge to 
harm the firm by their departure. 
• It allows the organization to appropriate its knowledge by combining its 
product development and workforce development processes. Saviotti 
(1998) alludes to this idea but does not pursue it further, either in that 
work or his follow-on research. The process by which the firm innovates 
is deliberate in its construction, allowing the organization to duplicate its 
successes properly without having to rely on a “Copy Exactly!” 
methodology, which requires innovation to stop completely, creating 
vulnerability for the organization. 
• It better motivates individual workers to absorb the knowledge that the 
organization wishes to flow. This is an important aspect of knowledge 
flow theory, which implies but does not directly address motivation from 
the learner’s perspective. This is an additional feature of the proposed 
system that the thesis addresses only superficially, but it is an important 
benefit where the goal is to ensure the knowledge is received and not just 
transmitted. 
E. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING 
The principles of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) are designed for the 
ultimate decision maker to have the information necessary to make the appropriate 
decision, and no more. The process that NDM facilitates is designed to eliminate the 
leader’s learning of extraneous information that could cloud his judgment at a critical 
junction, as illustrated in Figure 2–1. While this is a good decision for the organization, 
given the responsibility that the leader has and the impact of his or her decisions on the 
organization’s success as a whole, important decisions are made constantly throughout 
the organization. These decisions may not be as visible or obviously impactful, but wrong 
decisions by lower-level knowledge workers and supervisors have long-term effects that 
can lead organizations down the wrong path. 
To better visualize how the NDM process impacts decision making at the 
individual level, we review adaptation and combination of the knowledge transfer and 
absorption principles (Nissen 2010, 1622), illustrated in Figure 4–1. The second half of 
the NDM process depends mainly on what the decision maker can forecast for the various 
options available to choose from, and making the final decision based on the perceived 
best option. That forecast depends on the knowledge that the decision maker has, which 
at the individual level is not as deliberate as it is at the executive level. 
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Figure 4-1. Knowledge Flows—Model Representing the Flow of 
Knowledge Once It Is Created by the Transmitter’s Own Tacit 
Knowledge. 
 
The combination of knowledge flows from the transmitter’s tacit knowledge to the 
learner’s based on what that learner knows. For individual decision making, the critical 
element is to ensure that anyone in the organization that makes decisions which can 
impact the organization has the requisite level of knowledge to forecast the most accurate 
outcomes possible, and choose from those. Without proper and standardized tacit 
knowledge throughout the organization, individuals make critical yet uninformed 
decisions, which are rarely correct. From Nissen, Mark E. 2010. “Visualizing Knowledge 
Networks and Flows to Enhance Organizational Metacognition in VOs.” Connectivity 
and Knowledge Management in Virtual Organizations: Networking and Developing 
Interactive Communications. IGI Global: 74–88. 
The decision to increase operators’ knowledge level, or improve the systems’ 
ability to accurately filter irrelevant information to arrive at the best decision based on all 
the data and information available is a difficult one. Training the operators requires 
transferring specialized tacit knowledge beyond the knowledge chunks necessary to 
perform other functions in the organization, increasing the risk of important knowledge 
asset losses through attrition (McAusland and Kuhn 2011; Cohn, Khurana and Reeves 
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2005). Not training them and getting them more involved risks losing high-potential 
people through apathy or attrition as well (Martin and Schmidt 2010).  
Similarly, the codification required to create IT systems capable of robust 
information-discrimination risks the uniqueness of the organization’s knowledge (Saviotti 
1998), and can create an overreliance on those systems to the detriment of the leaders’ 
judgment in critical situations (Roberts and Dotterway 1995; Shattuck and Miller 2006).  
F. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
As discussed in Chapter II, the structure of the organization plays a major part in 
determining whether a certain form of organizational KM system will be successful. The 
following sections provide a summary of Mintzberg’s organizational structures and their 
appropriate means of coordination, and hence the applicable goal of their KM system 
(Mintzberg 1981). 
1. Simple Structure 
A single authority and center of knowledge, with no KM need since that individual 
directly supervises all actions, and delegates market-specific decisions to no one. 
2. Machine Bureaucracy 
A technostructure with both vertical and horizontal specialization, which requires 
little to no training since the organization is structured around its explicit knowledge, 
which standardizes its processes. This is an ideal organizational structure for exact 
duplication KM, which Szulanski’s research from 2002 to the present (Szulanski and 
Winter 2002; Szulanski and Jensen 2008). 
3. Professional Bureaucracy 
Defined as an operating core, like a doctor’s or lawyer’s practice, requiring much 
training and horizontal specialization. The expectation of baseline levels of professional 
competence requires a standardization of skills as a means of coordination. This KM 
methodology is common in both public and private markets, both as the main or a 
complimentary training system, such as human resources topics or other general training 
sessions, depending on the sophistication of the organization. 
 36 
4. Divisionalized Bureaucracy 
Not as specialized as the previous structure, the organization’s purpose is to 
standardize results or outputs, delegating process-related decisions to lower-level 
individuals. They are not as trained as the previous structure, but must have an in-depth 
understanding of both the organization’s desired goals and how their function individually 
fits in the organization to achieve the expected results. This means of coordination requires 
that the organization’s KM system “can stimulate and support interunit collaboration to 
leverage their dispersed resources” (Hansen and Nohria 2004, 22).  
5. Adhocracy 
An organization of experts, this structure’s design builds on the individuals’ 
expertise and specialization for complex collaborative initiatives. The nuance of this 
structure is that it is similar to a simple structure in terms of formalization, with the 
support staff being the critical element in the success of the organization. The main 
difference is that that the core of the organization is not an individual but a deep bench of 
specialists, and the means of coordination is mutual adjustment. It requires a large 
amount of specialized training, similar to the divisionalized bureaucracy, but leveraging a 
higher level of expertise at the individual level.  
G. ORGANIZATIONAL SELF-AWARENESS  
While many organizations are actively working to help knowledge flow to where 
it is needed, the path to knowledge superiority assumes that the knowledge to be 
transmitted is well-defined and essentially complete. There is little in the KM literature 
that discusses the evaluation of this premise. The decomposition of successful endeavors 
from a knowledge point of view as a central part of the proposed KM system addresses 
this need directly and allows the organization some flexibility on its desired 
organizational structure to succeed. 
Furthermore, understanding why an initiative is successful at the functional level 
allows the organization to better allocate its resources. This helps organizations to adapt 
its structure or means of control based on desired results instead of on being reactive to 
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others’ initiative or on the market itself. This increase in self-awareness is instrumental to 
the organization’s knowledge superiority. 
The conceptualization of this thesis’ proposed KM system can work with many 
different structures, but the need is greater for adhocracy and divisionalized structures. 
There are several examples of standardization of work, such as exact copying initiatives, 
and standardization of skills is the most common type of organizational KM initiatives. 
Simple structures must decide to grow past this initial form before needing anything other 
than basic KM. 
Important decisions that leaders and managers are making to help knowledge flow 
are not evaluated on the merits of the knowledge, but instead are made with the 
underlying assumption that as long as the knowledge flows, then KS will be achieved. 
Therefore, the proposed organizational KM system would invest considerable resources 
on training key individual knowledge workers to make decisions at the level that the 
leader is expected to perform. The same principles behind NDM and Situated Cognition 
apply to employees, not just as they discriminate information for the organization’s 
leaders, but they also are responsible for making important decisions themselves.  
For all these reasons, this thesis proposes an organizational KM system that 
focuses on individual tailoring of knowledge transfer initiatives and decision making, and 
correlates that tailoring to the structure of the organization to maximize the chances of 
success. The competitive advantage of such an integrated system would be difficult to 
imitate by competitors, increasing both the power and uniqueness of the firm’s 
knowledge, and with it its competitive advantage and knowledge superiority.  
The analysis in this chapter shows that organizations must consider their own 
nature and goals when determining how to implement KM in a way that will create a 
good fit with the organizations’ structure. It also illustrates that even though the KM 
paradox is inherent to the KM process itself, that does not necessarily mean that the 
challenge it presents is insurmountable, or does it make Creative Destruction absolutely 
inevitable. What it shows is that organizations should consider shifting their source of 
competitive advantage from their product lines to the innovation and KM system itself. 
The following chapter elaborates the design considerations and selection criteria 
for organizations seeking to implement the principles of this thesis.  
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IV. PROPOSED KM SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The preceding chapters described the current state of private and public 
organization competition, and the role that knowledge superiority plays in determining 
which organizations achieve market leadership and how long that leadership remains. 
They focused on the contrast between KM initiatives and their inability to prevent 
Creative Destruction from disrupting every market and discipline, and how or if it can be 
resolved. Chapter III evaluated how organizations should design or adapt their KM 
systems to fill that gap.  
This chapter describes the purpose of the proposed organizational KM system, 
updates the needs hierarchy and functional decomposition from Chapter II based on the 
analysis from Chapter III, and forecasts how implementation of this system would impact 
the sustainability of an organization’s competitive advantage. It develops the architecture 
and system boundaries to meet these needs, analyzes trade-offs and alternatives to the 
proposed system, and establishes performance benchmarks to analyze its effectiveness.  
A. SYSTEM PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The main purpose of this proposed KM system is to allow organizations to 
increase the power of their knowledge without diminishing the uniqueness of that 
knowledge, designed to fit the organization’s structure. As stated in previous chapters, 
these two knowledge attributes appear to be inversely proportional. For power to 
increase, knowledge must transfer and flow from being new, tacit and at the individual 
level to the whole organization as refined and tacit (Nissen 2006). As part of the 
transformation of knowledge, the process codifies and disseminates it, which reduces the 
appropriation and uniqueness of that knowledge and makes the organizational susceptible 
and vulnerable to competing initiatives based on the similar knowledge (Saviotti 1998; 
von Hippel 1994; Tuomi 1999). The organization would appear to have two options: 
maximize knowledge power while decreasing its uniqueness or preserving its uniqueness 
by limiting its power.  
Additionally, the specific process that the organization chooses to increase the 
power of its knowledge defines that organization’s means of coordination, which can 
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cause fundamental problems for the organization if it does not fit its structure (Mintzberg 
1981). The organization must decide, which attribute it is willing to adapt for a proper fit: 
its structure or its means of coordination. Because organizational dynamics are outside 
the scope of this thesis, the proposed design assumes one of two structures from 
Mintzberg’s definitions for this KM system; namely, a divisionalized form or an 
adhocracy. There is much literature and many working models for machine and 
professional bureaucracies, while simple structures do not require a KM system, by 
definition. 
A third option, as proposed in this thesis, is to transfer some of the organizational 
tacit knowledge, and hence its source of competitive advantage, to the organization itself, 
and its KM system. Instead of focusing solely on the industry-specific knowledge assets 
of the firm, the advantage would be in the architecture of the KM system itself. 
Competition focuses more on product and production process attributes. This shifts the 
competitive advantage inwardly so has the added benefit of masking the most valuable 
knowledge assets from potential imitators. The result is that it maintains the uniqueness 
of this knowledge while increasing its power through internalization. 
To maintain focus on what the system and its description here will address, the 
scope of this analysis on the following goals and objectives is limited as follows: 
• Maximizing knowledge power. This requires the right knowledge to flow 
to the right people, and includes ensuring the receiving individuals have 
enough knowledge themselves to effectively process the flow of signals 
from the source and turn them to useful tacit knowledge (Nissen 2006). 
This requires determining the total knowledge that each individual needs 
to have based on his position to achieve a commonality of results for all 
members of the organization. 
• Maintaining knowledge uniqueness. The way the system addresses this is 
by shifting the source of competitive advantage. Instead of focusing on the 
innovative process or product, the organization emphasizes the KM 
process itself that generates the innovations, which allows it to better 
duplicate its successes. This makes it more difficult for outside 
competitors, and even for internal members who could take important 
knowledge with them to a competitor to interfere with success.  
• Ensuring a fit between organizational structure and KM system objectives. 
The organization must redefine its structure and internal functionality both 
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to support the appropriate means of coordination and its corresponding 
KM system design.  
• Focus on critical decision-making processes. Since this thesis is concerned 
primarily with organizational structures that seek standardization of 
results, a dedicated focus on individuals’ training in decision making 
becomes a critical element to evaluate in designing the system 
• Analysis of knowledge transfer means and purposes, as they relate to their 
compatibility with the organization’s structure and strategic goals. 
This proposed framework differs from the current form of organizational KM the 
first and last points. It expands from current KM and flow theory, which identify 
knowledge clumps and implement systems to disseminate it to where it is needed, and 
encourages the organization to fully understand the nature and principles of their 
successes and failures at a component-of-knowledge, or “chunk” level. It then proposes a 
focus on tailored KM at the individual level, based on the results of the knowledge 
assessments, which would be focused on decomposing individuals’ body of knowledge 
and filling the gaps only as they are needed. An IT system that would support this 
framework, for example, would have “modules” or “chunks” of knowledge in five-or-
less-minute training sessions. The system would select the appropriate modules, or 
chunks of knowledge based on the individual’s knowledge gaps, and collate them into a 
coherent training session.  
The motivation element would be the result of the individuals’ understanding of 
both the gaps in their knowledge, and how those gaps are relevant to the required 
knowledge for the organization. This element is an area of further study that this author 
will pursue in the near term, but not as part of this thesis. 
B. MODEL ARCHITECTURE 
Beginning with how the organizational knowledge is evaluated, decomposed, and 
compartmentalized based on several key attributes the system would generate knowledge 
flow paths specifically designed for the learner. By breaking down the components of the 
organization’s knowledge, tacit and explicit, it would examine the relative importance of 
each of them based on their contribution to the organization’s success, and tailor a 
training plan that the learner is motivated to execute. Doing so would provide a 
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systematic process to achieve competitive advantage though knowledge superiority, 
leveraging assets already within the organization (Porter and Millar 1985), while 
appropriating the key knowledge to mitigate the risk of competition through imitation.  
This section elaborates on the architecture of the proposed KM system, 
specifically designed to address the major needs that are discussed in the preceding 
chapters. It states the needs and prioritizes them, defines the attributes of the system to 
address the needs, discusses the life cycle of the problem and of the needs, and lists the 
assumptions and constraints used as part of the design. It then establishes the boundaries 
of the system, analyzes the value of the system to the stakeholders and users, and 
provides a specific value proposition of the KM system. 
1. Statement and Hierarchy of Needs  
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is a list of five factors that impact an individual’s 
motivation to undertake current or future initiatives. The hierarchy indicates the 
prioritization of these needs, which as the Maslow’s theory proposes, must be addressed 
in the given order so that individuals will be motivated to continue. The order of these 
needs is physiological, safety, love/belonging, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow 
1943; Simons, Irwin and Drinnien 1987). 
The major stakeholders in the implementation of a new KM methodology and 
system are the organization’s owners and leaders, the mid-level managers charged with 
both implementing the change and interpreting its purpose, and the non-supervisory 
personnel that have little input on the decision. These stakeholders are all affected in 
similar ways by implementing the proposed changes in this thesis, with the differences 
being more a matter of degree of impact and perception of threat to their needs. The 
impacts are summarized here. 
a. Organizational Leaders 
The impacts to their needs are based on the performance of the organization and 
their own personal and professional reputations. There is an increase of physiological 
stress, which carries a risk to their financial safety and love/belonging from both family 
and coworkers, but given that they are the ones implementing the initiative, the risk to the 
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initiative itself is minimal once the decision is made by them to proceed. The stronger 
impacts are in their esteem and self-actualization needs, as they are more personally 
invested in the decision to implement new initiatives.  
b. Mid-Level Managers
At this level the impact to mid-level managers’ needs is more fundamental, 
though not as much as with non-supervisory personnel. As the implementers, mid-level 
managers are charged with pressing for other stakeholders’ goals, though their input for 
the initiative or its implementation process may be minimal. The increase in their 
physiological stress may be as high as, or higher than, the owners’, and the potential 
rewards are not nearly as substantial. Success of the initiative does not necessarily mean 
success for these stakeholders at the individual level, making their buy-in critical to their 
support of the initiative.  
The rest of their needs and perceived risk to them depends on the personal 
investment of the mid-level manager in the success of the organization. The challenge for 
the organization is to encourage that investment by incorporating these stakeholders into 
the decision-making process that will determine if and how to implement the proposed 
KM system. 
c. Non-Supervisory Personnel
These stakeholders would likely feel the impact at a more fundamental level in 
their hierarchy of needs. With little or no input into the decision-making process, they 
could oppose change if there is a perception of risk without an understanding of the 
reasons behind them or without a personal or professional stake in the organization’s 
success. It is a bigger challenge for the organization to get buy-in from these 
stakeholders, and the challenge to do so falls mostly to mid-level managers.  
These risks to the initiative’s implementation can be mitigated by competent 
managers if they are able to help these stakeholders change their perception of risk to 
their physiological and safety needs, such as loss of employment or income and the 
physical stresses caused by even worrying about these risks. They would also need to 
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find appropriate incentives for these employees that align with the organization’s success 
in implementing the proposed KM system.  
2. Measures of Performance 
Performance measures are defined as “quantitative values (estimated, predicted, 
and/or measured) that describe system performance” (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). 
With that in mind, the relevant measures of performance and utilization are: 
• Recruiting and Retention Effectiveness: Measured as the turnover rate of 
employees and the average time that knowledge-based positions are open. 
The impact of the proposed system is that it removes incentives from 
competitors to innovate through imitation by hiring the organization’s 
employees. This would be a long-term impact measure, as the implication 
of this proposal is that the competitive advantage currently lies in market 
knowledge, with an incentive among competitors to hire talent away. 
• Knowledge Assessment scores: Measured in terms of organizational 
knowledge value assessments, which includes defining value for each 
knowledge attribute and the expected knowledge level of each individual 
in the organization (Nissen 2014).  
• Operating Expenses: Energy, material wealth, matter, and information 
(EMMI) expenditure, the primary measure of which would be financial 
costs (salaries, training and reorganization programs, IT system costs). 
This is followed by time and resource costs due to the inefficiencies early 
in the life of the new system, and time to implement the system and the 
adjustments to the organization, including reviewing and planning the 
structure of the organization itself. 
• Awareness: Interest among the business units within the organization to 
coordinate efforts and more effectively share knowledge. This awareness 
increase would be measured by the increases in cross-division knowledge 
increases, particularly as it applies to the link between other divisions’ 
production and the organization’s strategic goals. 
3. Life Cycle of the Problem and the Need 
The problem’s conceptualization began when knowledge was unequivocally 
determined to be the source of sustained competitive advantage, even in the face of 
Creative Destruction. The problem of Creative Destruction far predates this, but this 
problem deals with the inconsistency that market leaders achieve their dominant positions 
by achieving knowledge superiority (Porter and Millar 1985), but then lose their lead to 
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companies with less knowledge. As organizations have implemented KM systems to 
achieve and sustain competitive advantage through knowledge, more research in how to 
increase the power and uniqueness of that knowledge has led to more sophisticated 
systems and initiatives, and better understanding of the nature of knowledge, yet Creative 
Destruction continues unabated.  
Additionally, research in organizational design shows that its structure fits a 
specific means of coordination (Mintzberg 1981). By evaluating Mintzberg’s means of 
coordination from a KM point of view, one sees that there is a direct relationship between 
them as follows: 
• Standardization of work or process directly relates to exact duplication of
explicit knowledge (Szulanski and Jensen 2008)
• Standardization of skills relates to standardization of training level,
applicable to highly-trained organizations with little need for cross-
training or other sophisticated methods of KM after indoctrination
• Standardization of results relates to a more nuanced form of KM, where
the duplication of knowledge requires a functional decomposition of
successes to adapt the template to different circumstances, rather than
exact duplication (Black and Morrison 2010)
• Mutual adjustment is a more sophisticated form of results’ standardization,
where there is less of an emphasis in skill-building and more on cross-
sectional knowledge sharing to address highly-complex knowledge-based
needs of the organization (Mintzberg 1981; Hargadon and Fanelli 2002)
The problem of KM systems is that they are not resolving the problem of 
unrealized competitive advantage, at least not in a sustainable way. The KM systems 
have yielded positive results, and in some cases very positive, such as franchising efforts 
by McDonalds, Starbucks, and many others, or successfully transferring manufacturing 
operations using working templates and exact copying (Szulanski and Winter 2002; 
Szulanski and Jensen 2008). However, many of the successes cited in the KM literature 
are with organizations that benefit from standardization of processes or skills as a means 
of coordination as opposed to those that seek to innovate or face complex situations that 
are beyond the ability to predict and prepare for using codified instructions.  
The problem has been materializing even as KM systems are institutionalized 
throughout industry or government agencies. These problems, where the current KM 
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initiatives are not wholly successful, occur mostly with innovative and dynamic public 
agencies and corporations (Black and Morrison 2010; Hargadon and Fanelli 2002). These 
organizations are most closely related with either divisionalized bureaucracies or 
adhocracies, where standardization of processes or skills are not a proper fit (Mintzberg 
1981). This is not to say that there are no benefits from forcing these organizations into 
KM systems that seek to exactly duplicate processes, but one loses the main benefit of the 
KM system, which is the competitive advantage (Hargadon and Sutton 2000; Porter and 
Millar 1985).  
In both cases, the use and disposition stages of the life cycle are the initial 
presentation of the proposed KM system and its implementation. The disposition of the 
problem occurs when the system is institutionalized, and market-leading organizations 
realize the increase in appropriation of their most valuable knowledge, as measured by 
not just sustaining competitive advantage but increasing it and market share.  
4. Assumptions, Constraints, and Definitions
           The system concept is based on the following assumptions and constraints: 
• Knowledge, as an attribute, “is a source of sustainable competitive
advantage” (Ambrosini and Bowman 2001). While this analysis looks at
differentiating types and relevance of knowledge chunks, the underlying
assumption remains.
• The costs of the system’s development and implementation will be
covered by the organizations R&D budget, since the system itself is
designed to be the main source of competitive advantage.
• This system design is focused on organizational structures that coordinate
via standardization of results. While it can be adapted to look at structures
that benefit more from standardized processes or skills, that adaptation is
not covered in the thesis.
• Situated Cognition theory (Shattuck and Miller 2006) dictates how
individuals make decisions.
• Organizations are interested in duplication of success for the sake of
expanding revenue and profits, as opposed to altruistic motives. The latter
do not necessarily change the design of the system, but they would affect
the measure of performance and the time window the system has to
demonstrate its value.
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• The organization’s innovation measurable are based on quantifiable 
differentiations, such as production/operations costs, increased revenues 
due to appeal of innovation, or both. Schmidt and Porteus (2000) define 
this as a given product’s or process’ Degree of Innovation. 
• The organizational structure depends on factors outside of the convenience 
of a given KM system. Hence, the decision on which type of KM 
methodology to pursue is subordinate to the structure that fits the 
organization best. 
• In an adhocracy, and to a lesser extent in a divisionalized bureaucracy, 
individuals who make decisions which could affect the organization in 
terms of its position in the market are designated key individuals, even if 
they are in lower or support levels in the organization.  
• The KM system can only support one type of KM methodology. The 
nuances of adopting parts of various methodologies and merging them is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
• The organization can afford to recruit and/or retain key talent as necessary 
to implement this system. The recruiting pool can support necessary hires. 
5. System Boundaries 
The proposed KM system has several boundaries that limit the scope of its design 
and its performance. Since it is a conceptual system, it has no physical boundaries except 
those of the organization and its workforce itself. Its functional and behavioral 
boundaries are in the two subsections below: 
a. Functional 
The functional boundaries of the KM system are: 
• Personnel management: The system delivers the functions that each 
position must fulfill and the knowledge necessary to accomplish those 
functions, but it does not dictate if that knowledge is acquired based on 
training plus a baseline of knowledge, or recruited SMEs. Research shows 
that there is a limit on the value of hiring nothing but SMEs with 
knowledge from other players in the market (Hatch and Dyer 2004). 
• Knowledge completeness: The system requires that the organization take 
steps to functionally breakdown the successes it seeks to duplicate, but it 
does not determine if the knowledge is complete without the organizations 
input. 
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• Success’ functional decomposition: Similarly, this function falls outside of 
the system, though it receives input directly from the organization’s efforts 
supporting it. 
• Organizational design: This determination could be designed into the 
system, but one of the key assumptions is that the organization’s structure 
is based on the overarching goals, and the KM system and methodology 
subordinate themselves to it. Also, the design of the system assumes a 
structure that fits with standardization of results as the means of 
coordination. 
• Decision making at the individual level: The system generates tailored 
training for individuals, but the function of determining which decisions 
need to be made where, and where those decisions lead, rests solely with 
the management team. 
b. Behavioral 
The behavioral boundaries of the proposed KM system are: 
• Specialization of skills: The system lends itself to assist cross-divisional 
and cross-functional training, but it cannot drive it. Only management can 
do that. 
• Decision making: Not all individuals, even specialists, are willing to make 
decisions without it being imposed on them. Again, this is a boundary 
where management alone can take action and press the key individuals to 
do so. 
• Organizational structure: If the organization is not aligned to operate 
effectively based on its goals, the necessary reorganization will face 
challenges that management alone can overcome. Since the structure is the 
prime factor in determining KM methodology, it is an input to the system, 
not an output. 
• Appropriation of knowledge: Even though the system is designed to shift 
the competitive advantage inwardly to the organization, it is not 
necessarily immune to imitation. The organization itself is responsible for 
appropriating the knowledge behind both the system and the products or 
services that make it competitive. 
• Learner motivation: Much like the specialization of skills mentioned 
above, the system can only aid in motivating learners by closing the gap 
between what the learner thinks she knows and what she actually knows. 
The incentives to close that gap are the responsibility of the organization 
(Nohria, Groysberg, and Lee 2008), and the system can assist in the 
evaluation and rewarding of motivated employees. 
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6. Stakeholder and User Analysis 
Stakeholders are individuals and entities that have a direct or indirect interest in, 
and/or are directly or indirectly impacted by the design, development, funding, 
implementation, operation, maintenance, and/or disposal of the proposed KM system. An 
abridged list includes: 
• Owners/shareholders: Ownership of the system, design, implementation, 
and disposition and life cycle costs, responsible for the suitability and 
effectiveness of the system, and trade-off selections 
• Senior Executives: Fiscal resources, support from the organization, 
recruiting of top talent, technology selection, preeminence in the market, 
reputation risk based on success of project. 
• Middle managers: Training, implementation, managing workforce 
opinions, and establishing performance measures for effectiveness 
evaluation and feedback. 
• Knowledge managers: Development of the knowledge assessments and 
decomposing the organization’s desired initiatives into knowledge chunks 
that will form the basis of the workforce development plan. 
• Subject matter experts: Owners of the key tacit knowledge in the 
organization, responsible for dissemination and quality-control of the 
knowledge chunks. Also serve as mentors for key knowledge workers and 
the knowledge managers, and contribute to the development of the 
individuals’ tailored stock of knowledge, which consists of “(a) role-
related normative expectations; (b) dispositions, which have been formed 
in the course of past socializations; and (c) local knowledge of particular 
circumstances of time and place” (Tsoukas 1996, 11). 
For the purposes of this KM system, users are customers are considered the same 
group. Further studies could address the impact on non-user customers of having a 
stronger organization to do business with, and the value of being considered innovative 
and strong, but that is outside the scope here. Instead, the user/customer is the recipient of 
the system’s outputs or the operator of the system. An abridged list includes: 
• Knowledge workers: Receive the output of the KM system, particularly 
the tailored, position-specific training based on knowledge assessment 
results.  
• Managers: Receive assessment results and performance improvement 
feedback based on implementation and execution of the KM system. 
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7. Value Proposition 
The value proposition of the system has four major attributes to contribute, but the 
largest contribution of the proposed KM system is the integration of all four attributes. 
Individually, they have contributed to the success of many organizations, but in general 
organizations still have not achieved the sustainable competitive advantage that KM 
promises. This integration, and the thesis in general, is a contribution toward the 
achievement of the goal of competitive advantages that are based on knowledge and are 
sustainable. 
The first contribution is the system’s inherent ability to transfer the organization’s 
main competitive advantage from products and production systems to the innovation 
practices its ability to duplicate them in varying conditions. This relies, of course, on the 
organization’s awareness of how their successes are constructed, and how the basic 
elements contribute to the success. The organization has more control of the key 
institutional knowledge, and would more effectively protect it by understanding how 
much and which kind of knowledge individuals need to perform their duties well. The 
construction of the system allows knowledge chunks to flow freely only in an 
environment that is designed to manage and use those chunks correctly. Without the 
system, the chunks are much less valuable, and hence the knowledge is more 
appropriated, which allows the organization to maximize the power if its knowledge 
more freely. 
A second key contribution is to make the organization aware of the impact its 
structure has on its potential to succeed with a given KM methodology. Rather than 
allowing the organization to force a standardization of processes or skills as the main 
means of coordination, the system adapts to, and in fact it is designed to support, 
structures that fit with a standardization of results and adhocracies. It tailors the KM 
methodology to the organization’s structure, which is based on the desired direction and 
strategic goals of the organization. 
The third contribution is that it would define which knowledge is actually 
necessary for the organization to not only succeed, but to duplicate its success. It does so 
with a deliberate innovation process which, while allowing freedom to the innovators to 
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operate as necessary, documents the principles behind each selection among alternatives 
so that when one becomes successful, that success can be deconstructed by the KM 
system, giving the organization more power out of the knowledge behind the innovation. 
Finally, the fourth contribution is to highlight the need for decision-making 
training much like executive leaders or military commanders, particularly in support of 
divisionalized bureaucracies and adhocracies, where lower-ranking individuals need to 
make critical decisions to achieve standardized results. These structures are not a good fit 
with standardized processes (Mintzberg 1981), but many organizations do not actively 
train low-level knowledge workers in C2 decision making at a level akin to executive 
leaders. It does not seem to matter that their decisions carry similar weight and 
consequences in organizations where they have to decide, on their own, how to achieve 
common results regardless of their starting point.  
Ultimately, the value of this proposition is the integration of these factors into a 
singular system. The contribution of this proposal is that it addresses multiple areas that 
have hindered the success of current KM systems by focusing on both the organizational 
structure, itself based on its mission and desired objectives, and on individual’s 
performance and level of knowledge. This focus not only improves performance at the 
individual and team levels, but also protects the organization from knowledge losses and 
inefficient knowledge transfers. 
C. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES AND SELECTION 
    This section covers the conceptualization of this KM system, from initial 
ideas and concepts through technological consideration, prioritizing the needs that 
the system should address, and evaluating alternatives. It then explains why the 
proposed KM system was chosen, the opportunity cost of that decision, and an overview 
of the expected performance of the system. 
1. Initial Ideas and Concepts
Based on the various needs highlighted so far in this thesis, there are several 
options for an organization to optimize the design and use of its KM systems. From 
looking at the organization’s own structure, the stated goal of its KM system in terms of 
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the knowledge attributes it chooses to improve, and the appropriation level of certain 
chunks of knowledge. At the same time, it must consider the needs and functions the 
system must address, and what changes, if any, does the organization need before, during, 
or after implementing the system.  
When first conceived, one of the proposed KM system attributes was a focus on 
the organization’s metacognition. It would evaluate the completeness of its knowledge as 
criteria for dissemination, with constant feedback mechanisms to challenge the assumed 
completeness and get that much closer to it. Many times, organizations think they know 
why something works when they actually do not, and in the process of dissemination the 
errors are exposed either via execution failure or external stakeholder feedback 
(Szulanski and Winter 2002; Black and Morrison 2010). Since KM initiatives require 
much collaboration and trust, especially when that collaboration is with external and even 
competing stakeholders (Nissen 2010), errors such as this bring the organization’s 
competency into question, and therefore they should be mitigated as much as possible. 
Another attribute was the determination and manipulation of the learner’s 
motivation. The idea behind this attribute is that for all the initiatives of knowledge flow-
path determination, it was very difficult to find much KM research that addresses how to 
motivate the employees and other learners to absorb the knowledge. A constant obstacle 
for knowledge-sharing networks (KSNs) and KM in general, and particularly in 
government agencies, is the belligerent resistance of SMEs to participate or accept, much 
less absorb, knowledge from outside their own areas of influence. The concept would be 
to develop a mathematical model that relates the difference between the learners’ 
perceived level of knowledge (LOK) and their perception of what their LOK needs to be 
with their motivation to learn. The variables in this model could be manipulated by 
multiple organizational initiatives to either increase the learners’ perception of what their 
LOK needs to be, decrease their perception of what their LOK is, or a combination of the 
two, thereby increasing their motivation to learn. 
A third conceptualization was the definition of the term Organizational Self-
Awareness itself. Initially, it was conceived as little more than organizational 
metacognition, with a market-leaning focus. The concept of this definition was that the 
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organization would know what it did to be successful, and how to invest its resources on 
the areas that were creating the most value for the organization. Since then, the definition 
has grown to address the organization’s structure itself and its relationship with the 
design of the KM system. Many times, management decides on the structure of the 
organization without evaluating whether that structure’s compatible means of 
coordination, instead choosing out of convenience or in an attempt to emulate other 
successful organizations that are similar (Mintzberg 1981; Szulanski and Winter 2002; 
Miles 2011). 
The last of the major initial concepts was decision making at the individual level. 
Focusing on the two more sophisticated organizational structures, divisionalized 
bureaucracies and adhocracies, the responsibility for the organization’s KM and overall 
success depends more on the decision making capabilities of individuals below the 
executive or senior management levels. Because the goal is to achieve a standard level of 
results, decisions made at various levels in the organization can all have an impact on 
those results, especially because there is no standard process or method. Those 
individuals and SMEs are responsible for how their choices affect the ultimate results. 
Therefore, the principles of NDM and Situated Cognition that are generally focused on 
the top of the organization would be applied to all the individuals below (Shattuck and 
Miller 2006). From the filtering processes of the IT systems and the information-filtering 
humans, the system that individuals use to make decisions require a deliberate analysis 
and design based on what the organization needs and expects from each of its key 
decision makers. 
2. Priorities 
Above all else, the priority is to gain and protect public influence or market share. 
Because the four major attributes of the system, which are summarized below, are all 
intertwined and require each other to succeed, this prioritization exercise will focus on 
the functions of the system and the needs they address. The prioritization criteria are 
based on the functions’ impact on the success of the system. Listed in order of priority: 
• Fit for the organization’s structure: The research behind this thesis 
indicates that the most common and impactful factor for a KM system’s 
chances of success is to match the KM methodology or means of 
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coordination with the organization’s structure. When referring to 
duplication of success, much of the KM literature refers to exact 
duplication of working templates, or standardization of processes. Based 
on Mintzberg’s work (1981), this creates a misfit for situations where 
standardization of results or mutual adjustment is the appropriate means to 
duplicate success. A misfit is likely to lead to failure regardless of the 
merits of the KM system. 
• Increasing knowledge power while maintaining its uniqueness: Referred to 
in this thesis as a knowledge paradox, the increase in knowledge power 
generally results in loss of uniqueness, or vice versa, facilitating the 
conditions that lead to Creative Destruction. By shifting the competitive 
advantage from its market offerings to the proposed KM system, which 
the organization has more control of, it can more freely leverage the power 
of its market knowledge while maintaining the uniqueness of the KM 
system knowledge that gives it sustainable competitive advantage. 
• Success decomposition: A key element to support the previous function is 
to understand the organization’s successes at the functional level, to 
ensure that when duplicating its successes, the organization does not 
unnecessarily try to duplicate areas that are not useful, or even detrimental 
to the duplication efforts. Additionally, understanding successes at the 
functional level allows the organization to better manage the knowledge 
necessary for each individual to succeed without risking duplication due to 
codifying and/or disseminating too much knowledge. 
• Individual decision-making preparation: This last function is specifically 
necessary for organizational structures that use standardized results or 
mutual adjustment as their means of coordination, which are the focus of 
the proposed KM system in this thesis. Because lower-level individuals 
are trusted to make the decisions that arrive at expected results, the 
decision making training needed at this level is equivalent to that of senior 
executives and commanders. The reason this is last in priority is that the 
previous three functions are required for this one to be necessary.  
Therefore, major changes to consider from the functional decomposition in 
Chapter II are: 
• Shifting the competitive advantage from the product to the innovation 
process itself, thereby allowing the organization to increase its 
knowledge’s power without crippling its uniqueness,  
• Developing tailored knowledge requirements and training for individuals 
to achieve them, by position,  
• Integrating the design of the organization’s structure to ensure a fit with 
the KM system’s desired outcomes, and  
 55 
• A KM focus on decision making by key individuals in the organization.  
3. Viable Alternatives 
One alternative is for the companies to focus exclusively on mentoring as a means 
to transfer tacit knowledge without necessarily codifying it. The ultimate goal of 
knowledge transfer is to go from tacit knowledge of the teacher to tacit knowledge of the 
receiver (Nissen 2006), and mentoring allows knowledge transfer with reduced 
codification (Swap, Leonard, Shields, and Abrams 2001), therefore maintaining the 
uniqueness and appropriation of the knowledge (von Hippel 1994). Additionally, 
mentoring has other inherent benefits to increase learning and improve other areas of 
performance (DeLong, Lees and Gabarro 2008; Cohn, Khurana and Reeves 2005).  
A second alternative is for organizations to innovate fast enough to keep ahead of 
imitation risks. While this alternative may be the most effective at achieving the goals set 
out earlier in this chapter, innovation is very difficult to achieve consistently (Andrew 
and Sirkin 2004; Porter 1985; Kandybin 2009). Additionally, many innovations occur 
even though the SMEs responsible for their development are not quite aware of why they 
were successful, making it difficult to duplicate outside a structure that supports 
standardization of work as a means of control (Mintzberg 1981). 
The third potential alternative is for organizations to focus on changing the 
structure of the organization to fit a convenient KM methodology. This alternative may 
need to be executed regardless of the implementation of the proposed KM system 
anyway, since the structure affects a fit with the organization’s KM system and its 
strategic goals. Many times the organization is not deliberate in deciding its structure 
(Mintzberg 1981), but for this level of change the reason should not be to fit with a 
preferred KM system. Knowledge management exists to serve the organization, not the 
other way around, so it should fit its structure, which in turn should fit executive leaders’ 
view of what the goals of the organization will be. 
Finally, a fourth alternative would be to force the preferred KM methodology into 
an organization regardless of its structure. This alternative is not practical for the 
organization structures that this proposed KM system is designed to address; namely, 
organizations that rely on standardization of results leveraging institutional or acquired 
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knowledge. Many organizations already force work standardization as a means of 
coordination regardless of their structure with negative results, which is the point of 
Mintzberg’s (1981) “Fashion or Fit” article. 
4. Selection Criteria 
The recommended system’s design and objectives are based on the decisions 
which selected among the various alternatives at an attribute by attribute level. While 
there are other means to achieve the goals of a system such as the one proposed, the 
reasons why this particular system was the final selection are that: 
• Consistency of results: Mentoring is very difficult to execute and to 
evaluate its effectiveness. While tacit knowledge as more power (Nissen 
2006; Thomas, Watts Sussman and Henderson 2001) and is more 
appropriable (Saviotti 1998), it is also difficult to measure its impact 
directly on the organization. Further, mentoring depends on the mentor’s 
effectiveness, which exacerbates the risk of results which do not meet the 
need for consistency of results. Innovation has similar issues in terms of 
difficulty to execute consistency. Changing the organization’s structure or 
forcing a means of coordination do not achieve much success, much less 
consistent one. 
• Practicality: There is ample research on trying to duplicate innovation 
(Szulanski and Winter 2002; Black and Morrison 2010), and mentoring 
has been implemented many times across various industries with mostly 
positive results but they have yet to meet the needs elaborated on in this 
thesis, summarized as preventing Creative Destruction through improved 
OSA. The organization structure alternatives are unlikely to succeed, as 
widespread research shows that those two options usually lead to more 
and deeper problems than the one this thesis seeks to address. 
• Applicability to the need: As mentioned before, none of the four listed 
alternatives fit the need directly and predictably. Mentoring depends on 
each individual with few means for standardization. Innovation focus does 
not necessary address the appropriateness and uniqueness protection need, 
but instead seeks to push the risk far enough into the future that another 
innovation would generate the market domination it seeks. Forcing the 
structure to shift in support of a desired KM system design is not only 
contrary to the point of building appropriate KM systems, but it ignores 
the organization’s specific goals that the KM systems serve to ensure. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND ITEMS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The study of knowledge superiority is ultimately the study of sustainable 
competitive advantages, particularly in the Information Age (Naval Postgraduate School 
2015). The advantage comes from the quality, type, and flow paths of the knowledge that 
supports action, which organizations leverage toward innovation and management 
(Nissen 2006). This competitive advantage grows with the organizational knowledge’s 
power, and as knowledge flows more from new, individual-level knowledge toward the 
whole organization as a refined asset, that advantage should grow with it. As a result, this 
widening of the gap between the knowledge leader and the rest of the market should be 
an insurmountable advantage that results in a monopoly, but this is not the case at all.  
A major challenge for KM systems to fully succeed is that tacit knowledge is 
difficult to codify well. Additionally, codifying knowledge implies a level of 
understanding of tacit knowledge that is not always complete, leading to surprising 
failures when trying to replicate successes following codified processes (Szulanski and 
Winter 2002), such as the failure of Japanese companies to duplicate their local success 
with their foreign subsidiaries (Black and Morrison 2010). When analyzing these types of 
failures, common traits emerge, such as organizational structures that do not fit with the 
KM methodology (Mintzberg 1981), missing essential pieces of the knowledge/process 
that were assumed-but-not-codified (Szulanski and Jensen 2008), or minimizing the 
importance of lessons learned that proved crucial for repeatable success (Miles 2011).  
A powerful observation from the research on The Way is “that the very factors 
that enabled Japan’s early success led to its later failure” (Black and Morrison 2010, 99). 
Those factors, such as “strong corporate policies, practices, thinking, and behaviors” that 
reinforced their business models, were the key elements to duplicate and achieve success 
(Black and Morrison 2010, 100). These executives never considered that their methods 
only worked domestically because they fit well with the Japanese culture itself, and that 
the key to their success was not the way they managed their domestic plants and 
personnel, but how their management system fit the culture where they were operating. 
The organizations understood how to succeed in a specific environment, but they did not 
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understand the functions in their initiatives that led to success, and hence were unable to 
adapt them to different environments. 
Analyzing the organizational structure and means of coordination of these 
Japanese companies indicates a deeper issue. They assumed that they were machine 
bureaucracies, which would justify standardization of processes at the management level. 
That fit their distrust of other cultures’ management competence and techniques, but not 
the reality of their situation. Manufacturing as an industry operates well as machine 
bureaucracies, but the management teams do not. The means of coordination they needed 
to succeed in management was a standardization of results, which required them to trust 
the expert local managers to achieve the expected results, perhaps aided by successful 
working templates. Instead of training their foreign management teams on the 
fundamentals of their success and individual decision making so they could generate the 
desired results, they placed all their trust standardized processes and culturally-nuanced 
management techniques that did not incorporate all the necessary knowledge to be 
successful. They never understood the composition of their success, the misfit of their 
organization’s structure for their management teams, and hence were unable to duplicate 
success.  
The fall of RIM’s Blackberry tells a similar story. Executives did not understand 
that upstart competitors, especially Apple, had imitated the key elements of Blackberry’s 
competitive advantage, such as creating a brand that conveyed technical competence and 
elegance which allowed Blackberry to dictate what made a good cell phone, and were 
leveraging them to create and expand their own. Apple in particular achieved this in other 
lines of business that RIM did not see as relevant to its market. They did not realize it 
because they could not recognize how success was forming within their competitors, or 
how they were falling short of meeting the market need that was evolving beyond what 
they were willing to offer. They felt that their strengths, such as a strong battery, a 
browser that did not demand much data, compatibility with the newest cellular data 
networks, strong security, and streamlined features designed to please its main clientele 
should have been good enough to keep their lead (McNish and Silcoff 2015b). Even now, 
they believe that they should not have lost their market share, and it is only a matter of 
time before they recover their market lead (Dummett 2015). To this day, RIM executives 
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do not understand the reasons why Blackberry was successful at the start, much less how 
to duplicate that success in the future. Their competitive advantage was the clients’ 
perception that their brand represented the highest level of technical competence in their 
field. When Apple took that from them, they realized that they “were not the dominant 
smartphone company anymore.” As they told McNish and Silcoff: “We’re grappling with 
who we are because we can’t be who we used to be anymore, which s***ed...It’s not 
clear what the hell to do.” (McNish and Silcoff 2015a, 170). 
Government agencies have suffered similar fates, for similar reasons. In the 
example from the introduction of this thesis, the MRS Alliance, along with the various 
NAVSEA agents responsible for surface Navy maintenance management, did not 
decompose their successes to understand their critical attributes, and did not leverage 
their knowledge-based advantages to sustain those competitive advantages. When the day 
came in 2008 to show their understanding and expand their competitive advantage, they 
failed to recognize that the time had arrived, much less were they prepared to present 
actionable recommendations. As SURFMEPP has replaced them at the head of the 
surface Navy maintenance market, it already faces the pressure to force its KM 
methodology and organizational structure to standardize processes, even in areas where 
its knowledge is not robust enough to justify it. As the upstart market leader, it must 
remain focused on the kind of organization structure suits it best, and subordinate its KM 
systems to fit that structure while resisting external pressures to yield.  
This concluding chapter summarizes the key findings of this research, its 
limitations, specific recommendations to address the findings, and recommended areas 
for further study. 
A. KEY FINDINGS 
This thesis proposes that organizations create their own sources of competitive 
advantage by developing KM systems and processes that internalize the uniqueness of 
their knowledge and disseminates the appropriate chunks of knowledge throughout the 
organization. The main lesson of this analysis is that competitive advantages from 
knowledge superiority are as mobile as the people, systems, or attributes in an 
organization that represent said advantages. Organizations maximize the power of 
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knowledge for competitive advantage by disseminating and institutionalizing that 
knowledge, but doing so reduces the uniqueness of that knowledge, and makes them 
susceptible and vulnerable to competition via recruiting, imitation, or both. If instead 
knowledge is isolated and allowed to clump in very few individuals and limited 
codification, the company protects itself from imitation but its knowledge loses its power 
due to obsolescence and internal inefficiencies. Finding a balance between maximizing 
power and uniqueness is elusive, and even if well-balanced, there are situations a 
competitor can use to leverage weaknesses in the organization’s KM system and overtake 
it, as evidenced by the rapid rise and fall of market leaders in both private and public 
industry.  
The key findings of this research are: 
• The required extent of knowledge codification depends on the KM 
methodology that best fits an organization’s structure. Machine 
bureaucracies, like fast food franchises, require extensive and detailed 
codification to standardize processes and copy working templates exactly. 
Divisional bureaucracies or adhocracies, like technology firms and many 
government agencies, particularly new ones, do not at all. In fact, they are 
harmed by extensive codification, which in addition to the misfit with the 
organization’s structure also create a sense of knowledge completeness 
that these structures are not designed to operate in.  
• Knowledge-based competitive advantage resides in the holder of said 
knowledge, be it an individual, a codified set of instructions, or in the 
architecture of the organization itself. The more portable the knowledge, 
the more vulnerable the organization is to losing its competitive advantage 
to imitators. In other words, an organization’s susceptibility and 
vulnerability to competition are inversely proportional to both its control 
of access to the knowledge and the mobility of that knowledge. It is 
possible to increase the power of the organization’s knowledge with 
minimal compromise of its uniqueness if it masters the knowledge at the 
functional level, and uses that understanding to control unnecessary access 
to that knowledge. The organization would understand how to allocate 
knowledge chunks, and ensure that the dissemination of the knowledge is 
limited on a need-to-know basis, protecting the uniqueness of it as a 
whole. 
• Successful initiatives are the result of decisions during their design 
process, many of them subtle and easy to overlook without a process to 
track those decisions and analyze how they directly contributed to the 
success of the initiatives. That analysis provides the organization a 
functional decomposition of those successes, and is a critical element in 
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duplicating successes without necessarily duplicating the processes that 
led to the first or best success. This is critical to design the proposed KM 
system, which can support the organizational structures that need more 
complex KM methodologies than exact duplication of processes. 
• When the KM methodology calls for coordination that focuses on results 
instead of processes or standardized skills, each individual that is 
responsible for delivering those results becomes the commander or senior 
executive of that deliverable. Therefore, the C2 training generally reserved 
for the most senior leaders becomes required for each of the lower-level 
decision makers and their information management staffs.  
B. LIMITATIONS 
Even in the best situations, where the organization understands why and how it is 
successful, KM systems cannot account for other organizational weaknesses. These 
include misfit organizational configuration (Mintzberg 1981), competitor’s ability to 
innovate based on their own knowledge assets (Porter 1985), inadequate C2 systems and 
training which can lead a leader to make bad decisions based on incomplete information 
or incorrect projections of future outcomes (Shattuck and Miller 2006). There are three 
major limitations that this research does not or cannot address.  
The first is the scope of the proposed KM system. While it is designed for certain 
organizational structures, and it can be tailored for any of them since its function remains 
the same regardless of the firms’ design, it cannot determine the direction of the 
organization and the design that would support it. This is entirely in the purview of its 
leaders.  
A second limitation in this research is the specific design of the KM system 
beyond a functional description. The business-case analysis for an organization to 
implement such a system is outside the scope of this research, including the acceptable 
performance and efficiency factors.  
The third limitation entails talent acquisition. There is ample research into the 
benefits and potential difficulties in recruiting and retaining various types of talent, 
including in the reference material for this thesis, but the analysis to determine the best fit 
of talent for the organization based on its design and KM methodology is beyond the 
scope here.  
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C. ITEMS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis represents but a small contribution to integrate the various KM, C2, 
and other workforce and business management tools to deliver a comprehensive solution 
to an age-old problem. There are several areas to expand these efforts and contribute 
further to provide tools for organizations to leverage their knowledge effectively while 
mitigating the risk of imitation from competitors. These include, in no particular order: 
• How to translate organizational functionality to define positional 
knowledge and skills requirements 
• How to reverse-engineer successes that were not functionally documented 
or deliberately designed 
• Which organizational structure is the most appropriate based on market 
demands or strategic goals 
• How to prioritize KM methodologies when an organization has multiple 
organizational structures, much like systems of systems 
• How to assign value and preeminence to specific knowledge chunks over 
others 
• How to manage organizational change and adapt KM methodologies to it 
• Appropriate training of decision makers and their information-filtering 
staffs, particularly as this relates to the most fitting means of coordination 
for a given organizational structure 
• Updated analysis of adhocracies as the Information Age has evolved since 
Mintzberg’s 1981 work. 
D. CLOSING REMARKS 
Creative Destruction may be as inevitable and inherent to competitive markets as 
Schumpeter says. After all, market leadership may be a result of knowledge superiority, 
but that is relative, rather than absolute. The constant market-changing innovations 
demonstrate that there is another dimension of knowledge, which no KM system can 
mitigate fully. The beauty or horror of the free-market economy is that nothing can stop 
true innovation. 
However, much of the churn in market leadership, corporate or public, is due to 
weaknesses that the market leader allowed its competitors to exploit when it was within 
 63 
its power not simply to prevent competitors from closing the gap but for itself to expand 
the competitive advantage. The reasons for this are varied, and the research in this thesis 
shows how a small number of critical oversights can lead successful organizations to 
make decisions that cost them significant market share or influence. The organizations 
may have implemented KM systems to mitigate this risk, but missteps in their application 
have led them to neutralize the benefits that these systems provide. This adds to the 
problem by instilling a false sense of security once implemented.  
The scope of this thesis narrowly focused on KM systems and their fit with 
organizational structures, though there are many factors that affect the effectiveness of 
KM initiatives. Some that are far outside the scope of this thesis. However, the research 
here is a starting point for organizational leaders to become more effective and to avoid 
making mistakes that counter the benefits that KM systems can provide. 
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